Damage Limitation and Decline in Institutional Powers: Russia’s Perception of the EU as a Security Actor 1999–2002 by Flikke, Geir
 
 
Damage Limitation and Decline  
in Institutional Powers: Russia’s Percep-
tion of the EU as a Security Actor 
1999–2002 
 
By Geir Flikke 

Contents 
 
 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 5 
1.1.  Damage Limitation and Decline in Institutional Powers:  Clarifying 
Some Concepts .................................................................................. 6 
1.2  Application of the Concepts: A First Note ........................................ 8 
1.3.  The Structure of the Argument: From Doctrine to Policies and 
Perceptions ...................................................................................... 11 
 
2. Europe as a Challenge: Russia’s Foreign and Security Doctrines............ 13 
2.1.  The Primakovian Outlook ............................................................... 13 
2.2.  Europe in Russia’s Security Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept 17 
2.3.  The “Europe” Strategy .................................................................... 19 
 
3. Inviting Europe: Russia’s Initial European Policies ................................. 23 
3.1.  Overcoming the Primakov Doctrine? .............................................. 23 
3.2.  A First Obstacle: The Chechen Issue .............................................. 24 
3.2.1. Perceptions of EU Actions: The Internal Dimension ............ 26 
3.2.2. Relating to the EU: The Lisbon Meeting............................... 29 
3.3.  Inviting Europe: Putin on the Fore .................................................. 33 
3.3.1. Russia’s EuroMD proposal and Transatalanticism ............... 37 
3.3.2. Domestic and Foreign Policy Interpretations of Putin’s  
               Tour ....................................................................................... 38 
3.4.  The EU as a Security Actor: The Balkans....................................... 40 
 
4. Debating Europe: The EU and NATO in Russia’s Security Debate  
Prior to September 11................................................................................ 46 
4.1.  The OSCE–EU Nexus: Preferred Partner?...................................... 46 
4.2.  The NATO–EU Nexus: Independent or Not? ................................. 51 
4.3.  Cooperation at Arm’s Length: The Problem of ESDP .................... 53 
 
5. Linking up to Europe: The EU and NATO in Russia’s Security Debate 
after September 11 .................................................................................... 58 
5.1.  Hyper-terrorism: An Agenda for Further Rapprochement? ............ 58 
5.2.  “NATO at 20”: Limitations and Ambiguities.................................. 62 
5.3.  Cooperative Multipolarism: Ambivalence and Uncertainty............ 66 
 
6. Conclusion................................................................................................ 70 
 
7. Literature .................................................................................................. 72 
 

1. Introduction 
When speaking in the German Bundestag on September 25, 2001, President 
Vladimir Putin underlined that “Russia is a friendly European nation.”1 Pur-
suant to this rather lackluster statement, Russia has chosen what has been 
termed a European vocation in foreign policies. Entering into a broad dia-
logue with the EU on political, economic and security issues and taking a 
pragmatic approach on NATO enlargement, Putin has during the course of 
2000–2001 made a considerable reorientation towards Europe and – in the 
words of Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov – made the 
“course of integration with Europe one of the key directions in Russia’s for-
eign policy.”2 Ivanov has never failed an opportunity to underline that the 
European direction will be “a priority in a long-term perspective.”3  
This reorientation towards Europe coincides with a considerable interest 
in Russia for the EU as an emerging actor on the international scene. 
Whereas Russia in the later part of the 1990s was caught in a dichotomy be-
tween opposing so-called NATO centrism in Europe and calling for an up-
grading of the OSCE,4 Russia has, under Putin, shown unveiled interest in 
the development of the EU’s security and defense dimension. European inte-
gration is considered a natural phenomenon – even in the sphere of defense 
and security – and Russia has sought to address this development en face. 
How shall we understand this interest and Russia’s foreign policy behav-
ior vis-à-vis the EU’s developing security identity? The aim of this report is 
to analyze the evolution of Russia’s perception of the EU as an actor in in-
ternational affairs during the course of 1999–2002 in the light of two inter-
pretive approaches for understanding Russia’s foreign policy behavior – 
damage limitation and decline in institutional powers. The period 1999–
2002 is chosen for numerous reasons. In addition to marking the peak of 
Russia’s interest for the development of the EU’s security and defense di-
mension, this period involved a gradual resumption of the NATO–Russia 
dialogue after the Kosovo crisis. Russia’s attempt to sculpt a foreign policy 
on the basis of these developments will be highlighted, and questions will be 
asked to which degree Russia considered the EU to be an alternative to 
NATO and whether or not the Russian endorsement of the EU as a future se-
curity actor stood out as a viable alternative to a stagnating OSCE strategy.  
Following from this, the report will discuss whether or not Russian inter-
est and endorsement of the EU’s security and defense dimension repeated 
the overall strategic perspective of the Primakov doctrine, which aimed at 
counterbalancing US unipolarism by playing on the differences between the 
US and Europe in international affairs. I ask this question since analysts are 
not equivocal to this end. Some suggest that “Primakov’s fall from power 
has not undercut the importance of multipolarity in Russian foreign policy. 
                                                     
1 “Speech by President Vladimir Putin in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny”, http://www.great-britain.mid.ru/GreatBritain/pr_rel/pres57.htm.  
2  Igor Ivanov, Novaya Rossiyskaya diplomatiya, Olma Press, Moscow 2001, p. 131. 
3  Ibid. p. 140. 
4  Russia’s dual track policy vis-à-vis these institutions is the major focus of a recent study 
of Russia’s foreign and security policies.  See Morten Jeppesen, Partnership and Discord. 
Russia and the Construction of a Post Cold War Security Architecture in Europe 1991–
2000, NUPI Report no. 276, 2003. 
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President Vladimir Putin has generally supported the foreign policy prescrip-
tions of Primakov.”5 Others claim that “under Putin, Russian foreign policy 
has made a marked departure from the Primakov doctrine, not least in re-
nouncing any challenge to the dominance of the US and any confrontational 
stance towards the West over issues such as the further enlargement of 
NATO or US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.” 6  
By analyzing perceptions, I seek to highlight the dominating trends in the 
discourse on the EU in Russia. This involves a broad orientation with regard 
to sources. Russia has engaged in a comprehensive debate on relating to the 
EU and NATO within the field of security, and the report draws on vast ma-
terial from the security debate within research circles and official speeches 
and newspaper reports. Perceptions will be linked to the interpretive ap-
proaches of damage limitation or declining institutional powers. A definition 
of these two approaches will be given below.  
1.1. Damage Limitation and Decline in Institutional Powers:  Clarifying 
Some Concepts 
The structuring argument in this report is based on two interpretative expla-
nations of Russia’s foreign and security policies – damage limitation and de-
cline in institutional powers. Russia’s perceptions of the EU as an actor in 
international affairs, and in part also Russia’s perceptions of NATO, will be 
analyzed as stemming from either one of these interpretive approaches.  
These concepts are defined as interpretations of Russia’s foreign policy 
behavior in the latter part of the 1990s. Sergey Medvedev defines damage 
limitation as a conscious strategy based on realist assumptions that Russia 
will protect national interests while “remaining in the general framework of 
dialogue with the West on security issues and use all institutional mecha-
nisms, first of all the OSCE.”7 Outlining the consolidation of Russia’s for-
eign policies around a realist position as one of Russia’s two competing cul-
tures (liberal institutionalism versus realism), Medvedev defines damage 
limitation as based on four principle pillars: unsentimental cooperation with 
the West (without illusions on being part of the Western community of val-
ues); limitation of the effects of Western institutions’ enlargement; a better 
differentiation among Russia’s foreign policy partners and consolidation of 
Russia’s leadership position in the post-Soviet area/ CIS. 
Damage limitation rests on a precondition that Russia does not seek to be 
a member of the Western security institutions, and will utilize foreign policy 
mechanisms to stall an unfavorable development of Western security institu-
tions’ enlargement into larger Europe. Russia seeks to “prevent the fixation 
of an unfavorable status quo by any treaty, agreement, or security system. 
                                                     
5  Thomas Ambrosio, “Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to US Foreign Policy 
in the Post-Cold War Era”, European Security, vol. 10, no. 1, 2001,p. 53. See also Hiski 
Haukkala, “A Problematic ‘strategic partnership’”, Dov Lynch (ed.), “EU–Russian secu-
rity dimensions”, ISS Occasional Papers no. 46, p. 10, 2003, where Haukkala maintains 
that seeing the EU as a political ally “gels rather well with the importance of multipolarity 
in the international system that still hold sway in Russia even after the sea change in its 
foreign policy following the terrorist strikes on 11 September 2001.” 
6  Clelia Rontoyanni, ”So far, so good? Russia and the ESDP”, International Affairs, vol. 
78, no. 4, 2002, p. 817. 
7  Sergei Medvedev, “Power, Space and Russian Foreign Policy”, in Ted Hopf (ed.), Under-
standings of Russian Foreign Policy, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 
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Russia is objectively interested in maintaining the current uncertain and un-
structured security arrangement that took shape in the wake of the Cold War 
as long as possible – preferably until the economic upsurge in Russia ex-
pected by the middle of the next decade.”8  
The second approach, decline in institutional powers, interprets Russia’s 
policies vis-à-vis the Western security system in a liberal institutionalism 
paradigm. In this perspective, Russia’s primary concern has been to avoid 
institutional isolation from Europe and to create a favorable institutional ar-
rangement for integrating closer with the Western security system. Morten 
Jeppesen assumes that this argument has explanatory weight in understand-
ing how Russia has engaged NATO in the NATO–Russia pact and in joining 
the PfP in 1994. While being unable to stall an unfavorable development of 
NATO enlargement and so-called NATO centrism in Europe, Russia joined 
hands with the Western security system in order to fixate an institutional ap-
proach to conflict resolution.  
Moreover, Russia’s attempt to upgrade the OSCE to a pan-European se-
curity organization with a separate Security Council followed the same pat-
tern of creating an institutional framework for conflict resolution. In Jeppe-
sen’s phrase, “Russia’s policy should be interpreted more in terms of a rela-
tive decline in institutional powers and in the (perceived) possibility to influ-
ence overall political developments in Europe.” Jeppesen maintains that in 
so far as Russia’s behavior could be interpreted in a zero-sum game, this was 
a game of institutional powers and access to Western institutions, rather than 
a traditional realist power struggle.9 
The differences between these two approaches are several. The damage 
limitation perspective represents a realist orientation and a status quo ap-
proach to European integration. The main objective is not integration, but 
partial cooperation within select issues, keeping in mind both the specific in-
terests of Russia, a diverging value system, and the overall strategy to play 
on differences in the transatlantic community and the EU. It suggests that 
Russia’s interests may very well differ from those of the Western commu-
nity, and that institutions will have limited leverage on Russian behavior. 
The issue of “power” is a relative one, in the sense that policy-making will 
be centered on making the Russian voice more visible in European affairs 
although not necessarily sustained by structural changes in the power bal-
ance. Influence stems from the ability to frame a coherent foreign policy on 
European affairs while working to consolidate Russia’s influence on the near 
abroad.  
The decline in institutional powers perspective suggests that institutions 
will shape Russian policies, and that the overall perspective of integration 
                                                     
8  Ibid. p. 46. 
9  Morten Jeppesen, Partnership and Discord, op.cit. p. 70–71. Although interrelated on the 
central assumption that Russia seeks to upgrade its positition in the Western security sys-
tem, these approaches attach variable explanatory weight to underlying motivations in 
Russia’s security and foreign policy behavior. Medvedev’s analysis rests on the presump-
tion that Russian derzhavnost’ motivations – e.g. the priority of being a considerable re-
gional power in the CIS and a considerable European power – informs Russian priorities. 
Jeppesen does not underplay this motif, and assumes that Russia’s approach to the Wes-
tern security system was that of a revisionist state, e.g. a state that is uncomforable with 
the structure of interstate relations. Yet Jeppesen argues that Russia’s foreign policy be-
havior was more dictated by the logics of balancing institutions – e.g. securing access to 
institutions while signalising a clear preference for alternatives to NATO centrism.  
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with Western structures will be a prerogative in Russian foreign policies. It 
suggests that Russia will consider partaking in Western institutions to be of 
higher importance than national interests and sculpt these interests to be 
more in line with those of the EU and NATO. 
1.2 Application of the Concepts: A First Note 
The aim of this study is to apply these two readings of Russian foreign pol-
icy behavior to structure Russia’s perceptions of the EU’s emerging foreign 
policy and security identity. Some preliminary comments will be made to 
illustrate this. First, traditionally oriented towards the dichotomy between 
upgrading the OSCE and stalling NATO enlargement, the development of 
the ESDP within the EU has provided Russia with an alternative policy field 
with regard to the Western security system in the post-Kosovo period. The 
ESDP represented a policy opportunity for Russia, a way to leave the conun-
drum of being marginalized in the European security network and a way to 
enter the European foreign and security policy scene.  
Secondly, although Russia had addressed developments within the WEU 
even before the Kosovo crisis,10 these efforts intensified after the Kosovo 
crisis and the ESDP emerged as a special policy field for Russia. This turn 
was based on the more general assumption that diverse and multiple rela-
tions between Russia and the EU within the field of security could soften 
Russia’s skeptical attitude towards NATO and bring about a new turn in 
European–Russian relations. In the analysis of Vladimir Baranovsky, this 
policy reflected Russia’s need for diversifying its foreign policies and to re-
inforce a European vector in Russia’s foreign and security policies. Hence, 
“the international political identity of the EU becomes more prominent, 
while Russia experiences a growing need for political interaction with other 
actors on the international scene.” In this interaction “both processes repre-
sent independent variables; their intersection is not inevitable, but the 
chances for them to reinforce each other are by no means small.”11  
In this perspective, as will be discussed in this report, Russia sought to 
solve the problem of declining institutional powers in Europe by taking a 
head-on approach to developments within the EU. Faced with a lingering 
OSCE strategy and still in opposition to NATO centrism, the EU represented 
a shortcut to European security affairs for Russia. Access and close associa-
tion to the ESDP process would make it possible for Russia to leave the 
backwater of the OSCE strategy – an organization that in Moscow shibbolet 
was turned into an organization for the democratization of the post-Soviet 
space more than the pan-European security organization Moscow wanted it 
to become. Moreover, closer security ties to the EU would enable Russia 
once again to flag the idea of a pan-European security system, this time un-
der the auspices of a closer security relationship between the EU and Russia. 
Finally, addressing the ESDP would also – if conceived as a serious Russian 
                                                     
10  For a detailed account, see Dmitry Danilov and Stephan de Spiegeleire, “Ot razmez-
hivaniya k sblizheniyu. Novye otnosheniya Rossii i Zapadnoy Evropy v sfere bezo-
pasnosti?”, Chaillot Paper no. 31, April 1998. 
11  Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes Towards the EU: Political Aspects, Programme 
on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Helsinki 2002, p. 30. 
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strategy – imply that Russia could secure access to institutions. Hence, the 
overall strategy of a zero-sum institutional power game could be achieved.  
This offered, however, also a possibility to pursue the long-term strategy 
of damage limitation. Addressing the EU would imply – for Russia – to add 
another element to the overall strategy of keeping an open European security 
process and avoid the fixation of an unfavorable Western security system. 
Following this line of argument, several studies have suggested that Russia’s 
preference for the ESDP has indeed been a balancing act through which a 
declining challenger seeks to alter the distribution of power and influence in 
the international system. Boosting an independent identity for the EU, Rus-
sia has sought to stall US unipolarism and NATO centrism in Europe, 
flagged various versions of a pan-European structure and a closer association 
between two of the poles in the warranted multipolar structure of interna-
tional relations – Russia and the EU. Analyzing what he has termed the de-
velopment from “hopeful curiosity” to an even more “warm embrace of the 
ESDP”12, Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen argues that Russia uses support to 
the CFSP and the ESDP as tools for “breaking down cohesion within NATO 
and – as a consequence of this – to narrow the power gap separating it from 
the US.”13 This strategy is expressed among other things in the foreign pol-
icy concept of Russia, which explicitly states that Russia will pursue a mul-
tipolar strategy aiming at diminishing the effect of US unipolarism in world 
affairs. 
Following the argument above, one should expect that Russian balancing 
behavior would imply a strategy to forge an alliance with the weaker part in 
transatlantic relations – largely by encouraging the formation of a European 
pillar within NATO under the leadership of the EU, or simply to flag and 
front independent security arrangements with the EU. Moving into position 
by addressing the ESDP as a favorable development would enable Russia to 
exercise influence on the perceived weaker part in the transatlantic axis, 
while achieving a strategic option of countering so-called NATO centrism in 
Europe.14 
This strategy has not, however, implied any unconditional bandwagoning 
with the ESDP, nor that some institutional arrangement with NATO is ex-
cluded. Applying the perspective of damage limitation, even unsentimental 
cooperation with NATO may serve the aims of this strategy in so far as it 
helps to boost NATO as an open political process. Damage limitation does 
not contradict closer association to Western security processes. Dov Lynch 
has captured this by conceptualizing Russian alignment with Western secu-
rity institutions after September 11 as meaning “strong hands at the helm to 
steer Russia towards association without moving so close as to become vul-
nerable to leverage.”15  
                                                     
12  Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, “Explaining the Russian Endorsement of the CFSP and the 
ESDP”, Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 4, 2002, p. 443. 
13  Ibid. p. 444. 
14  Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen suggests as much by assuming that Russian attempts to 
forge some sort of security relationship with the EU may serve as a tool to generate re-
sources and eliminate the power gap by means of improving the foreign and security pol-
icy position and “add weight to its own side of the power equation.” Flemming Splids-
boel-Hansen, “Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 3, 2002, pp. 377–78. 
15  Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Papers no.60, Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris 2003, p. 14. 
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Moreover, Russian interest in the ESDP has not spurred any discussion 
on possible Russian membership in the EU. Russia’s policies towards the 
ESDP have been dominated by a conditional approach. Promting the EU to 
define a “zone of interest” for the ESDP, Russia has engaged in a zero-sum 
game with the EU, which does not necessarily fit into the pattern of an insti-
tutional zero-sum game of balancing institutions against one another. More 
likely, this approach seems more in line with Michael Emerson’s assumption 
that “Russia would like to have a strategic partnership with the EU, agreeing 
in official communiques that this would be on the basis of common values. 
But it would also like to regain its dominant influence over the near abroad, 
playing by its own rules.”16 
I shall assume, as indicated above, that the concepts are interpretive – that 
is, readings of Russian foreign policy behavior. The perspectives will by and 
large be treated as complementary ones – that is, as having equal explanatory 
weight. By arguing that the decline in institutional powers was worrisome 
for Russia, it seems clear that Russia sought to find an institutional strong-
hold in the rapidly changing currents of European security affairs. NATO’s 
campaign in Kosovo in 1999 provided a landmark that was not considered as 
especially favorable for Russia. Facing a NATO that took on new responsi-
bilities and a EU that gradually developed a security and defense dimension, 
Russia was left without a voice in European security affairs, a fact that 
prompted a new approach to European security policies. In an institutional 
perspective, this policy could be understood as securing access to, and also 
leverage on European developments. Indeed, also Russia’s policies towards 
NATO – such as refraining from voicing its protests against NATO 
enlargement and joining in the “NATO at 20” structure – contribute to secur-
ing a diversification of Russia’s foreign and security policies by providing 
Russia with “what she needs the most, policy options.”17 
On the other hand, in the perspective of damage limitation, Russia’s pol-
icy of pragmatically addressing and cooperating with Western security insti-
tutions has fallen into line with the overall perspective of keeping all options 
open, thereby boosting an open pan-European security process, through 
which no single security organization should achieve a monopoly on security 
in the European dimension. Also aligning with NATO could be read in this 
context, in so far as Russian policy analysts have called for avoiding a 
repetition of the failed strategy to hold NATO at arm’s length while having 
to concede with enlargement. As it seems, Russia will utilize the 
opportunities provided for by a dialogue within the “NATO at 20” structure 
to flag central security preferences in Europe, such as preserving the current 
arms control regime, avoiding an unfavorable development with regard to 
the stationing of NATO forces on the territories of new members and 
flagging ideas pertaining to a “trilateral” security cooperation including 
Russia, EU and the US in strategically important questions for Russia. This 
entails one qualification with regard to the definition of damage limitation 
above – namely that also NATO may be part and parcel of such a strategy, 
and hence, that it is not confined solely to utilizing the OSCE as a primary 
tool.  
                                                     
16  Michael Emerson, The Elephant and the Bear. The European Union, Russia and their 
Near Abroads, CEPS Policy paper, 2001, p. 23. 
17  Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, op.cit. p. 8. 
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Having made some preliminary qualifications with regard to the interpre-
tive approaches sketched above, I will proceed to discuss the structure of this 
report in more detail.  
1.3. The Structure of the Argument: From Doctrine to Policies and Per-
ceptions 
As suggested above, the two perspectives will be treated in a complementary 
manner. Variable emphasis will be put on the explanatory weight of these 
perspectives, however, depending on the context. The second chapter starts 
off by debating the perception of the EU as an actor as reflected in Russia’s 
foreign and security doctrines and medium-term strategy (MTR) on relations 
with the European Union. In Henrikki Heikkas words, these texts represent 
the fundamental continuity in Russia’s strategic political culture and “a con-
sensus on the imperative to counterbalance Western power in order to pro-
mote a multipolar international system.”18 Moreover, these doctrines are – 
according to Heikka – fundamental as a key to understanding Russia’s for-
eign policies in so far as they shape a set of priorities that have the dominat-
ing political culture as a precondition. In this perspective “Russian grand 
strategy is not empty rhetoric, but a body of evidence with serious value for 
predicting and explaining Russian foreign and security policy.”19 
The relationship between doctrines and foreign policy actions and priori-
ties is naturally a complex one, and I do not suggest that there is a causal re-
lationship between doctrines and foreign policy actions. Yet, doctrines offer, 
as suggested by Heikka above, a key to understanding the foreign policy 
choices of Russia under Putin. The central claim in this report is that damage 
limitation was a predominant perspective in the security and foreign policy 
doctrines of Russia and that this perspective did not exclude a more positive 
view of European integration efforts. The EU was envisaged as an actor that 
could counterbalance NATO centrism in Europe and one that could offer 
Russia certain security dividends. Hence, pragmatic cooperation with EU in-
stitutions was viewed as a possible path for Russia in dealing with the unfa-
vorable security situation after the Kosovo crisis. 
The third chapter seeks to illustrate how this played out in terms of for-
eign policy choices at the beginning of Putin’s tenure. It establishes that 
Russia, in pursuit of strategic dividends, conceptualized a perception of the 
EU not only as an economic actor, but one that also had a say in strategic 
disarmament and security. It offers insights into how Russian policy-makers 
interpreted these capacities vis-à-vis the US and goes more into detail on 
how Russia sculpted the relationship with the ESDP. In discussing Russia’s 
policies on the Balkans, I suggest that Russia did not have a clear concept of 
how this would play out regionally. Russia expected the EU to attain a more 
clearly defined security role, but was simultaneously confronted with the 
tight coupling of Western institutions on the Balkans and a declining possi-
bility to influence on Balkan events by means of traditional foreign policy 
                                                     
18  Henrikki Heikka, Beyond the Cult of the Offensive. The Evolution of Soviet/Russian Stra-
tegic Culture and its Implications for the Nordic-Baltic Region, Programme of the 
Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no. 10, 2000, p. 85. 
19  Ibid. p. 13. 
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instruments. The central claim is that Russia sculpted foreign policies within 
a damage limitation perspective, seeking to make the “European” voice in 
strategic questions more salient and visible. 
The fourth and fifth chapters deal more explicitly with the security debate 
in Russia within policy-making and research environments. The overarching 
perspective in this discussion is that of declining institutional powers – e.g. 
limited possibilities to affect the development in Europe by means of institu-
tional arrangements. I claim that Russia had certain expectations to the EU 
that were not met by developments in the security dialogue between the EU 
and Russia. Moreover, by introducing September 11 as a watershed, I sug-
gest that rosy expectations were substituted by a more tempered view on EU 
developments and a transfer of concerns towards developing a dialogue and 
some institutional arrangement with NATO. At the bottom line, these con-
cerns were linked to both decline in institutional powers and damage limita-
tion – e.g. the need to find a modus vivendi with Western institutions based 
on pragmatism and realism. 
Chapter six summarizes the discussion in the preceeding chapters and of-
fers the conclusion that both damage limitation and decline in institutional 
powers may explain Russian priorities vis-à-vis the perceived role of the EU 
as a foreign policy and security actor. Yet, emphasis will be put on the fact 
that liberal-minded research circles have gone somewhat further in stressing 
the decline in institutional power perspective, whereas official policy state-
ments have been more in line with damage limitation. 
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2. Europe as a Challenge: Russia’s Foreign and Security Doc-
trines  
When analyzing the perception of the EU in Russia’s security outlook in the 
1990s, it is hard to get around the frequent assertion that there has been a 
“lack of dynamism from the part of Moscow” in this period.20 At least in the 
latter part of the 1990s, Russia’s security outlook has been colored by the 
multipolar paradigm, where the EU explicitly has been conceptualized as a 
counterbalance to so-called NATO centrism in Europe and US dominance.21 
These tendencies were especially dominant in what Russian foreign policy 
analysts termed the “Primakov doctrine”, but spilled partly over to the new 
security and foreign policy doctrines adopted in early 2000. In fact, even 
Russia’s Medium–Term Strategy on the EU has borrowed heavily from the 
multipolar concept.  
This chapter seeks to establish the fundamental background parameters of 
Russia’s conceptualization of the EU as an actor. It starts off by discussing 
Yeltsin’s policies vis-à-vis the EU/WEU and the essential features of the 
Primakov doctrine as reflected in the security concepts of Russia. Finally, it 
also analyzes Russia’s Medium–Term Strategy on the EU (MTS) and the 
implicit conditionality for a closer relationship that is outlined in the strat-
egy. 
2.1. The Primakovian Outlook 
Before Primakov became minister of foreign affairs, Russia approached the 
Western security system with a mixture of caution and naivety. As observed 
by Igor Leshukov, the EU was perceived as one of many European institu-
tions that Russia could enter into as soon as the Russian leadership decided, 
or simply as a process that mattered little for Russia’s overall European for-
eign policy.22 Although Yeltsin at several instances flagged membership in 
the EU as an option, Russia’s primary attitude in the 1990s was one of scep-
ticism and concern that the enlarging security system of the West would 
leave Russia without a clearly defined place in the European security archi-
tecture. Hence, Andrey Kozyrev maintained in 1994 that the WEU should 
become a component of the OSCE, rather than being part and parcel of a se-
curity architecture to which Russia had no access.23 Moreover, when ad-
dressing the Federal Assembly in June 1996, President Yeltsin stated that: 
                                                     
20  Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes Towards the EU: Political Aspects, op.cit. p. 8.  
21  For a definition of the multipolar paradigm, see Dmitri Trenin, “Nenadezhnaya strate-
giya”, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii 1991-2000, Pro et Contra, 2001. Trenin sees the crux 
of the multipolar paradigm as being the formation of independent blocs or alliances that 
“counter US power and softens US hegemony.” In the Russian case, this balancing act is 
explicitly directed towards launching Russia as a considerable global power in internatio-
nal affairs. For an analysis in the multipolar spirit, see Vitaliy Zhurkin et al. Evropa v 
mnogopolyarnom mire, Ekslibris press, Moscow 2000. 
22  Igor Leshukov, “Rossiya i Evropeyskiy Soyuz: strategiya vzaimootnosheniya”, in Dmitry 
Trenin (ed.), Rossiya i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v XXI vek, 
Moskovskiy tsentr Karnegi, Moscow 2000.   
23  See Andrei Zagorski, “Russia and European Institutions”, in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), 
Russia and Europe: the Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 
519–40. In spite of limited access to WEU, Russia still entered into a formal dialogue 
with the WEU on several issues in October 1994. See Zagorski, p. 531. Russia also tried 
to compensate for lacking institutional access to the WEU by proposing that a permanent 
Council for Consultations be created. Kozyrev made the proposal in October 1995 in a 
letter to the then foreign minister of Spain, Javier Solana, who held the chairmanship of 
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Seeking to cooperate with NATO and the WEU, the Russian Federation cannot 
agree with the attempts to transfer the center of gravity in security questions on 
the continent to organizations where Russia is not represented. Russia vindicates 
the creation of a pan-European security mechanism where all countries partici-
pate, including the Russian Federation.24 
 
Fronting the OSCE as the only pan-European security organization where 
Russia was fully represented, Moscow addressed the Western security sys-
tem in a dual manner, expressing clear preference for the OSCE as the lead-
ing security structure for Europe, while, on the other hand, opposing a Euro-
pean security complex based solely on NATO. This position was explicitly 
spelled out under Primakov. The Primakovian “multipolar” vision saw the 
tendency towards “Eurocentrism” through the looking glass of counterbal-
ancing US dominance.25 Eurocentrism was a process that would “gain the 
upper hand over the European countries’ transatlantic orientation,” Primakov 
suggested.26 Moreover, Russia’s particular contribution to cement both 
“Eurocentrism” and avoid NATO centrism was an unspecified European 
Conference model for the whole continent. 
 
The future model of European security should in one or another form support it-
self on all international organizations that are active in the sphere of European 
security – the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO (including PfP), the 
EU and the WEU and the CIS.27 
 
The essence of this view was presented in Nezavisimaya gazeta as a non-
paper from researchers connected to the military general staff. The article 
proposed to strengthen the efficiency of the OSCE by means of creating a 
“Security Council” (Executive Committee) for the OSCE that should include 
France, Russia, the US, Germany and Britain as permanent members. The 
Council should create joint military-political structures for the OSCE, sim-
plify decision-making processes, strengthen the “responsibility of Russia” in 
European affairs and create a “strategic union” between Russia and central 
West–European states. Notably, this would lead to a “positive reception of 
the PfP by Russia”, and furthermore: 
 
On the basis of this it will be possible to develop cooperation between Russian 
and NATO structures and WEU structures.28 
 
While preferring to upgrade the significance of the OSCE, Moscow did not 
seem to harbor any illusions on effectively utilizing the OSCE as an organi-
zation to counter NATO centrism in Europe. The OSCE was to serve first 
                                                     
the WEU. See Dmitry Danilov and Stephan de Spiegeleire, “Ot razmezhivaniya k sbliz-
heniyu. Novye otnosheniya Rossii i Zapadnoy Evropy v sfere bezopasnosti?”, Chaillot 
Paper no. 31, April 1998, p. 17. 
24  “O natsional’noy bezopasnosti”, NeGa June 14, 1996. 
25  For a detailed treatment of the Primakov doctrine, see Clelia Rontonnyani, ”So far, so 
good? Russia and the ESDP”, op.cit. pp. 814–16. 
26  “Na gorizonte mnogopolyusny mir”, NeGa October 22, 1996. 
27  Ibid. 
28  “’Silovoy karkas’ Evropy”, Nezavisimoye voennoye obozrenie no. 22, 1997. 
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and foremost as a preferred pan-European institution for Moscow, and a way 
to influence European affairs. This position was especially dominant as 
Moscow realized that it could not halt the first round of NATO enlargement. 
Primakov made an explicit point that the two organizations “do not exclude 
one another.” Moreover: 
 
When we say that the OSCE should become the fundament for the European se-
curity system, this does not imply that NATO should cease to exist. […] We’re 
not against NATO as such; we only exclude NATO as the only, or most impor-
tant force in European security […]. We cannot influence NATO through the 
OSCE, but we can influence on the situation in Europe as such. 29 
 
Such propositions pointed to the overall concern of Moscow to be left with-
out a specified place in European security affairs, and also the perspective of 
a zero-sum institutional game. Clearly, Moscow did not assume that mem-
bership of the OSCE would imply that Russia had any direct institutional 
leverage on NATO. However, by upgrading the OSCE’s primary functions, 
Russia indirectly balanced the two institutions up against one another, not by 
banning NATO, but by suggesting that the OSCE should have a last say in 
European security affairs. In Jeppesen’s phrase, Russia sought henceforth to 
“outweigh NATO’s role” – or at least to pacify and commit NATO.30 
On the other hand, the very focus on the OSCE as the leading security 
organization in Europe echoed the priorities of damage limitation – to halt 
the enlargement of NATO and avoid “NATO centrism” in Europe. Condi-
tionality vis-à-vis the EU was a case in point. Russia envisaged a closer co-
operation with the WEU only in the light that it would be possible to en-
hance the role of the OSCE in Europe and create some sort of European Se-
curity Council within its framework. 
Clearly, the OSCE did at any rate not meet Russia’s ambitions of being a 
significant European power. Hence, as a sidetrack, Russia vigorously pur-
sued a cultivation of bilateral relations with central European states.31 Defin-
ing the OSCE as a security organization of primary importance for Russia, 
and also one through which Russia could have “an effect in European af-
fairs”, Moscow simultaneously harbored ambitions to cement relations with 
Germany and France to the extent that Moscow launched the idea of a “big 
troika” in European affairs.32 Apparently, Moscow viewed this first of all as 
an opportunity to discuss serious concerns in a European setting and to give 
substance to its ambition to be a European power. In a larger perspective, 
however, Russia also saw the troika as a means of influencing on European 
integration. As argued by Splidsboel-Hansen, the troika was launched at the 
Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg in 1997 with the specific intention 
                                                     
29  “Ya chuvstvuyu doverie prezidenta”, NeGa, December 30, 1997.  
30  Morten Jeppesen, Partnership and Discord, op.cit. p. 70. 
31  Vladimir Baranovsky explicitly states that “Russia’s interest in developing a ‘pan-
European architecture’ is accompanied by Moscow’s orientation towards promoting bilat-
eral relations with a number of key players in Europe.” Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia: a 
part of Europe or apart from Europe?”, op.cit. p. 454. See also Vladimir Baranovsky, Rus-
sia’s Attitudes Towards the EU, op.cit. p. 46. 
32  “Ya chuvstvuyu doverie prezidenta”, NeGa, December 30 1997. 
Geir Flikke 
nupi december 03 
16 
of linking up to EU processes and to effectuate the larger strategy of playing 
on differences between Europe and the US.33 
Bilateral and multilateral relations with major European powers played 
an important role also for Russia’s foreign policies on the Balkans. Allen C. 
Lynch has argued that Russia’s European foreign policy was remarkably 
continuous in the 1990s and centered on carving out a space as a regional 
European power. Lynch forwards as an example that the unilateral Russian 
countering of NATO’s ultimatum to Serbia in February 1994 served as a 
platform for a larger strategy to gain foothold in European affairs without 
having to choose between a strategic partnership with the West and its 
weight as a great power in European affairs.34 The Russian demarche re-
sulted in the establishment of the Contact Group as a framework for a group 
of five (France, US, Germany, Britain and Russia), which made it possible 
for Moscow to maneuver with regard to Serbia without jeopardizing ties to 
European powers.35 Still, although Russia succeeded in adopting a policy 
that separated the Bosnian Serbs from those in Serbia and was tailored to suit 
the territorial integrity of Serbia proper, Russia did not have leverage on 
NATO actions on the Balkans. 
Hence, Russia’s cultivation of good relations with the major European 
countries and its place in the Contact Group did not provide Russia with a 
consolidated foothold in the European security system, let alone solve the 
decline in institutional powers. This became acutely clear during the Kosovo 
crisis, when Russia broke off emerging contacts with NATO in the PJC. De 
facto, the crisis implied for Russia that earlier doctrines and strategies had to 
be revised. As stated by Igor Ivanov in March 2000, the Kosovo crisis was 
instrumental in “forcing Russia to revise its national security concept.”36 On 
the other hand, this process made it possible for Russia also to reconsider re-
lations with the EU. Vladimir Baranovsky observes that during the Kosovo 
crisis, Russia’s indignation was directed “predominately and almost exclu-
sively against the USA – as if the Europeans did not participate at all.”37 Al-
though this may certainly be an object of more thorough discussions, it is 
clear that Russia still had an option as to revising a static perception of the 
                                                     
33  Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, “Explaining the Russian Endorsement of the CFSP and the 
ESDP”, op.cit. pp. 447–48. For a different view that focuses on these statements as an op-
tion for a closer Russia–EU security relationship, see Dmitry Danilov and Stephan de 
Spiegeleire, “Ot razmezhivaniya k sblizheniyu. Novye otnosheniya Rossii i Zapadnoy Ev-
ropy v sfere bezopasnosti?”, op.cit. pp. 2–3. 
34  Allen C. Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, 
no. 1, 2001, p. 15. Arguably, harsh internal opposition in the newly inaugurated State 
Duma against NATO’s ultimatum shaped the Russian initiative. For a discussion of these 
internal debates, see Geir Flikke, “Party Organisation in Transitional Parliaments”, The 
Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2002. 
35  Allen C. Lynch “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy”, op.cit. pp. 14–17. 
36  Igor Ivanov, “Kosovskiy krizis: god spustya”, Dipkur’er-NG, March 23, 2000. The depu-
ty chairman of the State Duma, Vladimir Lukin, who stated that Russia corrected its mili-
tary doctrine immediately after NATO’s new strategic concept, voices similar assertions. 
Vladimir Lukin, ”God posle Stambula”, Dipkur’er-NG, November 9, 2000. 
37  Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes Towards the EU, op.cit. p. 75. Russian analyst 
Oleg Barabanov does not share this approach and suggests that the conceptualization of 
the EU as a more peaceful partner than NATO overlooks the fact that prominent EU 
countries were among those who favored a military campaign in Kosovo. See Oleg Bara-
banov, “Tendentsii razvytiya OVPB i ZES: nezhdannyy vyzov dlya Rossii?”, in Dmitri 
Trenin (ed.), Rossiya i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope, Moscow Carnegie En-
dowment, 2000, p. 98. 
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EU and adjusting to European developments such as St. Malo in 1998 and 
the Maastricht Treaty.  
2.2. Europe in Russia’s Security Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept 
The Kosovo crisis implied a setback for the relationship between Russia and 
Europe and is – according to some estimates – still an event that colors Rus-
sia’s foreign and security outlook.38 Clearly, Russia’s assessment of the 
NATO campaign was reflected in the new security and foreign policy doc-
trines adopted in the latter part of 1999 and the first half of 2000. As “na-
tional grand strategies” these doctrines reflected a total outlook on interna-
tional relations, which served as an inventory list over Russia’s primary con-
cerns in the international system, but also over the consequences of being 
outside the core of the Western security system.39  
Following in this vein, the Security Doctrine of Russia, adopted in Janu-
ary 2000, took a rather gloomy outlook on international relations and Rus-
sia’s place in the emerging world order. Earlier optimism on the possibility 
of engaging in a balancing act against unipolarism in a predominantly multi-
polar world was substituted by pessimism with regard to regional and global 
developments – especially the development of NATO as a regional collec-
tive defense and security organization, and the drift of the European security 
architecture towards what the doctrine termed “NATO centrism” in Europe. 
More specifically, the Security Doctrine outlined “two incompatible 
trends” in the international system. First, the doctrine observed “a consider-
able number of states are highly integrated economically and politically.” In 
this perspective, “economic, political, technological, ecological and factors 
pertaining to create a common informational space are playing a readily 
more important role.” Russia should in this respect “facilitate the creation of 
a multipolar world.”40 The other tendency was designed to:  
 
[…] create international structures that are based on the dominance over the in-
ternational system by Western developed countries under the leadership of the 
US. These structures are designed for unilateral, first and foremost military solu-
tions to central issues in the international system, in violation of the fundamental 
principles of international law.41 
 
Notably, the doctrine combined new security threats with a traditional state-
centered view of Russia as economically weak, albeit among “the largest 
countries of the world”, and with a considerable military, economic and po-
litical potential in addition to holding a central strategic position in Eurasia. 
                                                     
38  Ibid. p. 74.  
39  The significance of these doctrines as blueprints for Russia’s foreign policy conducts is 
estimated differently. For a comprehensive approach, see Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Rus-
sian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis”, European Se-
curity, vol. 9, no. 4, 2000. For a more positive interpretation, see Vladimir Baranovsky, 
“Russia: a part of Europe or apart from Europe”, International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, 
2000, p. 457. Baranovsky stresses that the concept underlines that Russia wants to be 
among the more developed states in the world, not against them. 
40  “Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 
January 18, 2000. 
41  Ibid. 
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Moreover, the doctrine anticipated new threats and risks, but preserved at the 
same time a traditional state-centric vision of these threats. 
 
Several states are activating their efforts to weaken Russia’s positions in the po-
litical, economic and military sphere. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests while 
solving international problems, also in conflict situations, may undermine inter-
national security and stability […] In many countries, including in Russia, the 
problem of international terrorism has become more acute and threatens global 
stability. The international community should hence unite its efforts to effec-
tively combat this threat and adopt urgent measures to neutralize it.42 
 
Russia’s security doctrine addressed primarily Russia’s place in the world 
order and did not explicitly spell out the European dimension of Russia’s 
foreign policies. This was done with more precision in the Foreign Policy 
Concept of Russia adopted on June 28, 2000. The concept took off from ac-
knowledging that many of the initially optimistic aspirations of the 1993 
concept to engage in equal and mutually beneficial relations with the sur-
rounding world had not been met. Moreover, regional and subregional inte-
gration in Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Asian-Pacific region har-
bored promises that regional units could become “substantial factors in re-
gional and subregional security and peacekeeping.”43 In this aspect, Russia 
saw European integration as a key event in defining Russia’s foreign policies 
vis-à-vis Europe.  
 
The relations with the European Union are of key importance. The processes that 
take place in the EU will increasingly affect the internal dynamics in Europe. 
These processes are enlargement, the euro, institutional reforms, the establish-
ment of the CFSP and the ESDP.44 
 
The concept did not refrain from suggesting that the most likely “channel” 
for Russian influence into these processes would still be bilateral ties to ma-
jor European states. Indeed, the concept suggested that Russia should seek to 
defend its interest “as applied to the sphere of bilateral relations with EU 
member states.”45 Moreover, the foreign policy concept did not depart in 
substance from the general strategic orientation of the Security Doctrine. 
Russia’s foreign policy priorities would still be oriented towards preserving 
a privileged position in the CIS space and developing the OSCE as a pan-
European security organization. Yet, the singling out of the ESDP as a field 
of “special interest”, and the fact that Russia in 1999 had adopted what was 
referred to as the Medium-Term Strategy of Russia on the EU, suggested 
that Moscow would at least pursue a policy in which the EU emerged as a 
regional priority for Russia. A fact illustrating this point is the emergence of 
a special medium-term strategy on Russia’s relations with the EU. 
                                                     
42  Ibid. 
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2.3. The “Europe” Strategy 
Taking into account the pessimistic outlook of the security doctrine of Rus-
sia vis-à-vis the Western security system, the emergence of a specific Euro-
pean strategy in Russia may seem as somewhat surprising. Even more so 
since Putin – in the capacity of Prime Minister – came out on what Pavel 
Baev has termed a rather “unpromising start” with the Chechen campaign 
making headlines in all talks with European leaders.46 Nevertheless, the 
Putin administration must have seen relations with the EU as a necessity for 
Russia’s foreign and security outlook. By the fall of 1999, Moscow had at 
least started to elaborate a specific response strategy to the Common Strat-
egy on Russia (CSR) adopted at Cologne 1999. Unlike any other part of the 
security concept, this paper was presented for a European audience and de-
livered at the summit between EU and Russia on October 22, 1999 in Hel-
sinki in response to the Cologne strategy.47 On the other hand, the document 
was in itself not elaborated in close coordination with the EU, a fact that has 
been pointed out many places.48  
Although the Medium–Term Strategy may be considered a response to 
the CSR, the document did not, however, deviate substantially from the out-
look of the security doctrine.49 Judging from the document itself and percep-
tions in the Russian press, Putin was looking for a “Russia first” attitude 
from the EU, which did not aim at reducing Russia’s role as the interlocutor 
privilégié in the former CIS space.50 This position was explicitly highlighted 
in the strategy, which argued that Russia would, on the one hand, utilize the 
experience of the EU to strengthen integration processes in the CIS, and, on 
the other hand, adopt measures against attempts from the EU to open “spe-
cial relations” with member states of the CIS.51 Moreover, the Russian party 
was also interested in being more than solely a recipient of assistance from 
the EU – Russia should be considered a trade partner on equal terms. The 
                                                     
46  Pavel Baev, ”Putin’s Foreign Policy Agenda: Post-Soviet Challenges to the European 
Orientation”, in Arkady Moshes and Bertil Nygren (eds.), A Slavic triangle? Present and 
Future relations Between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Swedish National Defense Col-
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47  See Pavel Baev, ”Putin’s Foreign Policy agenda”, op.cit. and Isabella Falcon, “Putin’s 
Russia and Europe: a new start?”, in Yuri Fedorov and Bertil Nygren (eds.), The Russian 
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adopted on June 3 2000. In comparison the Security Strategy of Russia was adopted in 
April 2000.  
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11, 2001. 
49  Henrikki Heikka argues that the strategy is explicitly based on the multipolar paradigm 
and a reflection of Russian realist thinking and strategic culture. Hence, although there 
might be better prospects for cooperation between the EU and Russia in the economic 
sphere, environmental protection and law enforcement, “Russia’s policy remains creation 
of a ‘partnership’ based on ‘equality’ with the EU to counterbalance US influence in Eu-
rope.” Henrikki Heikka, Beyond the Cult of the Offensive, op.cit., p. 85. 
50  ”Evrosoyuz kritikoval Putina za Chechnyu”, NeGa October 23 1999. 
51  “Strategiya razvitiya otnosheniy Rossiyskoy federatsii c Evropeyskim Soyuzom na sred-
nesrochnuyu perspektivu (2000-2010 gody)”, quoted from Igor Ivanov Novaya rossiy-
skaya diplomatiya, op.cit. p. 281. 
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document established Russia’s interests as a guiding principle, and linked the 
Europe strategy explicitly to the overall objective of “forming a multipolar 
world.”52 Although references were made to the objective of securing a 
“compatibility of their economies”, the focus on achieving a European secu-
rity architecture that was more in line with Russia’s national interests, 
topped the strategy.  
 
The fundamental aim of this strategy is to secure the national interests of the 
Russian Federation, strengthen its role and authority in Europe and the world by 
creating a viable pan-European system of collective security. The strategy shall 
also aim at drawing on the economic and administrative experience of the Euro-
pean Union to facilitate the development of a socially oriented market economy 
in the Russian Federation, based on the principles of competition and the further 
development of a democratic rule-by-law state.53 
 
Notably, the strategy refrained from the vehemently critical rhetoric exer-
cised by Moscow during the Kosovo crisis, and aimed at addressing possible 
future European developments. Without specifying how to institutionalize 
the relationship, the strategy voiced the creation of a “common European 
system of collective security based on the forces of the Europeans them-
selves, without isolating the US and NATO, but in avoidance of a NATO 
and US monopoly at the European continent.”54 To the latter extent, the 
strategy proposed to develop a specific position from Russia on issues per-
taining to the ESDP and the future inclusion of the WEU in the EU. Hence, 
Russia would adopt a position with regard to:  
 
[…] practical cooperation in the sphere of security (peacekeeping, conflict regu-
lation, disarmament) that may serve as a counterweight to NATO centrism in 
Europe.55 
 
The strategy also responded to the EU strategy by presenting a list of soft se-
curity issues. Article 8 in the strategy makes an almost breath-taking point 
by listing several cooperative proposals aiming at “strengthening the com-
mon European positions in the world economy and in world politics.” The 
list included everything from deliverances of energy to the internal European 
market, deepened scientific cooperation, also within military technology, 
unification of electricity networks, gas- and oil pipelines and transport lines 
and so forth. As observed by David Gowan, these propositions were “sweep-
ing, but mostly imprecise”, and tended to maximize Russian interests.56 
Moreover, rapprochement was again made conditional on Russia’s exclusive 
role in the CIS, or what Clelia Rontonnyani has termed a “misperception of 
EU intentions” in this area.57 
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In return, the development of the partnership with the European Union should 
facilitate the strengthening of the Russian Federation as the leading force in the 
formation of a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the 
CIS space.58 
 
Hence, Russia approached the EU through a series of various conditions, one 
of which was the insistence that Russia should still play first fiddle in the 
CIS space. Moreover, whereas the specific development of the ESDP was 
not an issue in the EUs CSR, Russia lifted the issue relatively high on the bi-
lateral agenda in EU–Russia relations.  
In sum, there were few indications that Russia had altered its basic secu-
rity outlook in the post-Kosovo period. Indeed, according to David Gowan, 
the MTS offered “insights (often unguarded) into the tactical objectives in 
their [the Russians] dealing with the EU.”59 Hiski Haukkala shares this view 
in asserting that “even here [in the MTR] the role of the EU is seen in rather 
instrumental terms, with NATO and the US seen as more relevant players. 
The main role of the developing cooperation with EU is seen as a counter-
balance to ‘NATO centrism’ in Europe.”60 Indeed, Russian media viewed 
Putin’s Helsinki-tour as a demonstration of Russia’s possibly enhanced role 
in European affairs. Rossiyskaya gazeta, the official government newspa-
per,61 presented the European strategy as “aiming at establishing and 
strengthening the partnership between the EU and Russia in world affairs” 
and centered on “joint conflict prevention and solutions to local conflicts in 
Europe, with an emphasis on the principle of non-violence and international 
law.”62  
Employing the interpretive approaches of damage limitation and decline 
in institutional powers, it seems clear that both the MTS and Russia’s foreign 
and security concept harbored an ambition of addressing the development of 
European institutions. From the perspective of damage limitation, this strat-
egy would imply that Russia actively tried to engage Western institutions 
while recovering economically. Security pluralism in Europe would serve a 
long-term aim of keeping the European security process as open as possible, 
and encouraging the development of the ESDP would only contribute to this. 
Pursuant to the perspective of decline in institutional powers, Russia’s 
emerging perception of the EU as an independent actor could harbor a more 
distinct ambition to resolve the problem of lacking influence by linking up 
closely to emerging institutions. This includes a strategy of balancing institu-
tional preferences against one another. The ESDP provided a new option for 
Russia to influence European affairs, and possibly to integrate institutionally 
with Europe. 
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At any rate, it is clear that although the strategy signalized a more proac-
tive approach to Europe from part of Russia and the new president, the doc-
trines gave few concrete indications on how foreign policies would evolve 
under Putin. The strategy outlined a common denominator for the foreign 
and security outlook of Russia, and one that was adopted alongside with the 
gradual consolidation of presidential power.63 Bringing Russia’s new “Euro-
pean” policies into play implied first and foremost to sculpt a new foreign 
policy line vis-à-vis Europe. The next chapter deals more explicitly with the 
policy choices and the policy actions of the new Putin administration in the 
first and latter parts of 2000. 
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3. Inviting Europe: Russia’s Initial European Policies 
The foregoing chapter discussed the content and internal hierarchical struc-
ture of what has been termed the most important sources in defining Russia’s 
primary attitudes towards Europe.64 The operative modus of these doctrines 
is geared towards limiting the negative effect of an enlarged Western secu-
rity system based on NATO. Addressing the EU within the security dimen-
sion falls in line with this priority. Damage limitation was the overriding 
strategy, although institutional balancing also played a part. Russia’s recep-
tive role of the EU was linked to the multipolar strategy of making the EU a 
more independent and visible actor, while the list of preferred organizations 
put the OSCE on the top, with the EU and NATO ranging below. When the 
EU was singeled out as more attractive to NATO, this was clearly linked to 
preferences – Moscow wanted the EU to take on a security role to the detri-
ment of NATO. 
The following chapter seeks to analyze how these priorities played out in 
the internal debate on the EU and Russia’s political initiatives vis-à-vis 
Europe. Perceptions are put in context, and linked to the first steps of sculpt-
ing a specific European foreign policy under Putin. Focus will be put on how 
Russia dealt with the primary preoccupation of avoiding isolation from 
Europe, developing a comprehensive dialogue with the EU – also in the 
sphere of security and predominantly within a multipolar worldview, and 
how Russia responded to possible EU sanctions due to the Chechen cam-
paign.  
3.1. Overcoming the Primakov Doctrine? 
By the end of 1999 it became increasingly clear that Russia was prepared to 
address the issue of European security also within the EU dimension. 
Whether or not this implied a definite departure from the Primakov doctrine 
is – as suggested above – an open question.65 Russian diplomacy was at any 
rate geared towards moulding a co-operative environment and tuning down 
possible ideational overlays from the Primakov period. Hence, according to 
Igor Ivanov, “when we in Russia talk about multipolarity, we anticipate the 
various poles not as competing with one another, but as fundamental build-
ing blocs of the new world order.”66 
Building a cooperative relationship with the EU became a fundamental 
priority in this approach, and Moscow had used bilateral contacts in order to 
voice these intentions. Addressing questions of European integration in a 
speech to the French Senate in October 1999, Ivanov argued that the pres-
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ence of mutual strategies had opened up for a cooperative climate with long-
term consequences: 
 
We see the European Union as an important economic and also a political part-
ner. As the Amsterdam Treaty enters into force there are no political taboos in 
our political dialogue. We are prepared for a confidential discussion on all heated 
questions; we understand the efforts of the EU memberstates to form a single se-
curity and defense policy and we are prepared for partnership relations in this 
sphere.67 
 
Acting President, Vladimir Putin, struck similar notes in a statement before 
the Coordination Group for Multilateral Negotiations on the Middle East in 
January 2000, where he claimed that “Russia stands for the formation of a 
stable and indivisible Europe. The conditions for this exist, among them in 
the Charter of European Security adopted in November last year at the sum-
mit of the OSCE in Istanbul”, and added that “Russia is a reliable, construc-
tive and predictable partner in the building of greater Europe. Our policies 
will continue to be honest, open and transparent. This we also expect from 
our European partners.”68 
The cooperative stance of the new administration thus played on both in-
novative and traditional themes in the Russia security and foreign policy out-
look. Most importantly, the foreign policy decision-makers seemed to accept 
the emerging status of the EU as an international actor. Addressing the issue 
of EU implied overcoming pending political differences between EU and 
Russia, however. At the end of 1999, this implied first and foremost to de-
velop a political dialogue from what seemed to be a political deadlock over 
Russia’s Chechen campaign.  
3.2. A First Obstacle: The Chechen Issue 
When Prime Minister Putin met with European leaders in Helsinki in Octo-
ber 1999 and discussed the future relationship between the EU and Russia, 
European leaders had become increasingly concerned about the resumption 
of the Chechen campaign in September 1999. This particular situation 
proved a challenge, not only for the relationship between Russia and EU, but 
also for the coherence of EU foreign policies.69 In fact, none of the EU min-
isters (with the exception of the Finnish) attended the conference of foreign 
ministers on the Finnish Northern Dimension initiative organized in Novem-
ber 1999 due to the Chechen conflict.70  
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Initially, the EU had responded to the crisis in Dagestan in August 1999 
by recognizing Russia’s territorial integrity and giving “moral support” to 
Russia.71 By October 2000, however, EU reactions were more colored by the 
disproportionate use of military power in the Chechen republic. The General 
Affairs Council called for a political solution to the conflict and the EU-
Russia summit in October 1999 was burdened by the event. In November 
1999, the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council demanded a 
freeze in TACIS assistance to Russia over the Chechen war.  
By the end of 1999, relations reached a low point. At the Helsinki summit 
in December 1999, the European Council issued a declaration in which Rus-
sia’s military campaign was declared to be in violation of international hu-
man rights standards and OSCE and Council of Europe norms. The Council 
set out to consider measures to affect Russia’s behavior, and called for a re-
view of the implementation plan of the CSR and limitations of the TACIS 
program.72 In the upshot, the EU, in January 2000, while awaiting further 
reports from the PACE delegation to Ingushetiya in January 2000, proposed 
to revise the work plan for implementing the CSR, invited the European 
Commission to reconsider the TACIS 2000 program and prolonged the sus-
pension of the agreement of scientific and technological cooperation.73 
The EU measures have been considered to be “mild” sanctions, and even 
“pseudo-sanctions.”74 Indeed, the working plan for the CSR was only de-
layed and presented by the Portuguese chairman on February 15, 2000. Fur-
thermore, the European Council had, in spite of the harsh political condem-
nation of the Chechnya military campaign, also on December 17, 1999 
adopted a first joint action under the CSR for non-proliferation and disar-
mament in Russia and thus actually implemented a first step in CFSP poli-
cies towards Russia.75  
Clearly, by proposing sanctions, the EU activated a certain inherent am-
bivalence that has been pinpointed by numerous analysts. Isabelle Falcon has 
analyzed the response in European capitals to that of the elections to the 
State Duma in 1999 and the preparations to the presidential elections in Rus-
sia. Her conclusion is that Chechnya presented the EU with a dilemma “how 
to express disapproval in order to answer the concerns of domestic public 
opinion without pressuring Moscow with using sanctions, which again 
would endanger the new start in relations with the Kremlin.”76 Others share 
this analysis. Hiski Haukkala argues that the “sensation of not being able to 
influence Russia’s behavior was accompanied by a growing realization that 
the member states had a lot to lose in terms of focusing too acutely on the 
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Chechen problem alone, as the member states risked politically alienating 
Moscow from the ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU.”77 
Hence, by March 2000, the EU seemed set on not letting the Chechen is-
sue make the headline in EU–Russia relations. Javier Solana expressed in an 
interview in Nezavisimaya gazeta that the “partnership between Russia and 
the EU is attaining a strategic character.”78 The EU did not dispute Russia’s 
territorial integrity, Solana stated, nor did it dispute the “right to fight terror-
ism.” But “each action designed to facilitate this should be in accordance 
with fundamental human rights.”79 Although this did not freeze the political 
stalemate over Chechnya, it did at least sidetrack the debate from being an 
essential part of the emerging relationship between EU and Russia. 
How did Russian decision-makers perceive the EU as an actor at this spe-
cific point? Were European institutions in any way effective in altering Rus-
sia’s political priorities? 
3.2.1. Perceptions of EU Actions: The Internal Dimension 
Two aspects need to be singled out as important for the subsequent rap-
prochement between the EU and Russia in the first half of 2000. First, the 
EU leaders used the prospects of exclusion from the PACE as a constant re-
minder that Russia had to develop in accordance with democratic principles. 
The Chechen issue was discussed both bilaterally (Germany and Italy) and at 
the Lisbon summit (Portugal). Secondly, the issue of being excluded from 
the PACE clearly spurred the internal debate on Russian–European relations 
in Russia. To be sure, the Russian State Duma, in the absence of any other 
candidate, and due to the fact that the newly elected Duma had not yet been 
in session, sent the notorious Vladimir Zhirinovsky as head of the delegation 
to the PACE on January 27.80 This most certainly implied that the issue of 
isolating Russian from Europe would receive an utmost extravagant expres-
sion and did not contribute to a softening of positions. 
On the other hand, the standoff opened a debate through which the EU 
emerged as a policy option for the Russian presidency. On January 14, 2000, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta recommended the acting president to “take the offen-
sive in foreign policies.”81 The Helsinki meeting of the European Union had 
ended in indications from the Union that it would “reconsider the specter of 
relations with Russia due to Chechnya”, the article read. Moreover, referring 
to the stream of concerned European politicians who visited Moscow in 
January due to the Chechen conflict (Lord Russel-Johnson from the PACE, 
Ireland’s minister of foreign affairs, David Andrews, also chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe), the newspaper maintained 
that the EU needed a signal from the Russian leader in order to climb down 
from former “hard” positions on Chechnya.  
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For Vladimir Putin the situation is identical [to that of the EU]: a static and 
‘firm’ defensive position in talks with Europe and the West, although it has been 
effective to this point in time, will not give any dividends. A more offensive po-
sition would not only alter the situation, but also lead to a break-through [in rela-
tions with the EU].82 
 
During the first months of 2000, the Kremlin made substantial efforts to 
convince the PACE delegation and also European leaders that the Chechen 
campaign was in fact what Russian authorities claimed it to be – an anti-
terror operation. One well-documented fact thereto is the oft-quoted fact that 
President Putin spent some three hours in convincing the leader of the PACE 
delegation, Lord Russel-Johnson, what the campaign was really all about.83 
More so, the Chechen issue clearly also put in question the more intricate 
problem of Russia’s “Europeanness.” This was clearly demonstrated in Rus-
sia’s responses in the PACE. Although Russia did not openly fear the exclu-
sion from the PACE, the official Kremlin line with regard to Russia’s place 
in Europe was to underline that Russian membership of European institu-
tions was a sine qua non for the continued dialogue between Russia and 
Europe. 84 Hence, at the 50th anniversary of the Council of Europe in 1999, 
Igor Ivanov stressed that the “integration of Russia in the Council of Europe 
has had one important aspect.” 
 
Russia is an integral part of the European continent and its civilization. There 
cannot be any Russia without Europe as there cannot be any Europe without 
Russia. In this sense, our entrance into the Council of Europe is only natural.85 
 
Clearly, this argument worked as to underlining the continued path of Russia 
towards democratic ideals and a democratic development. According to 
Ivanov, Russia moved consciously to adopt commonly accepted European 
juridical norms, had joined 28 European conventions before 1999 and 
planned to mark the 50th anniversary by adopting ten new ones.86  
Yet, Russia read “Europe” in terms of its overarching security priorities 
with regard to a common pan-European security structure. Supporting a 
Europe without dividing lines, Russia’s minister blamed the Council of 
Europe for not being able to take a stance against NATO action in Kosovo, 
referring to this disability as “an exception.”87 Moreover, Russia saw the 
emerging security space in Europe as one stemming from what it repeatedly 
proposed as a closer interaction between the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE. These organizations should together form “a partnership for democ-
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racy”, Russia’s minister proposed, meaning tighter institutionalized connec-
tions between the OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
The outline of Russia’s place in a Europe consisting of normative juridi-
cal acts was coupled with a reading of the Chechen conflict as one of Russia 
paying its service to the European community by defending the European 
space against a “barbarian onslaught” from the east. Speaking to the PACE 
in January 2000, Igor Ivanov stressed that the Chechen conflict should be 
well known through the work of the OSCE support group that had been 
working on the ground there since 1995. He continued: 
 
Russia is in reality defending the borders of Europe from a barbarian onslaught 
of international terrorism, which effectively and insistently builds an axis of in-
fluence: Afghanistan–Central-Asia–Caucasus–the Balkans. All these conflict re-
gions are today penetrated by the activities of international terrorism. In contrast 
to the international society, international terrorists are today united and in ac-
tion.88 
 
Various politicians activated this self-interpretation in what seemed to be a 
consolidated political position in the emerging elite. Hence, secretary of the 
presidential Security Council, Sergey Ivanov, when commenting on the new 
Security Doctrine adopted in January 2000, acknowledged not only that 
“Russia’s primary security challenges are internal by nature”, but that Russia 
was indeed making its worth as a European state by struggling to fence off 
the emerging threat from international terrorism.  
 
[…] we have seen an unprecedented increased activity by international terrorist 
organizations, which have chosen Russia as a place for testing out its far-
reaching intentions. Unfortunately, not all states understand that by starting an 
anti-terror operation in Chechnya, Russia has engaged in a struggle against ter-
rorism on its own territory, which is in the interests of the whole world, includ-
ing the Western countries.89 
 
What the Russian elite seemed to fear the most was the “Balkanization” of 
Russia. As acting Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin had put the argument into 
effect thereby signalizing that Russia would not cave in on the issue. 
 
If we do not stall the extremists, a future Yugoslavia will develop on the territory 
of the Russian Federation. A Yugoslavization of Russia will threaten us. If we 
had let the crisis spark in Dagestan, things would have taken off. We would have 
lost the Caucasus–Dagestan and Ingushetiya – and then the crisis would have 
spread along the Volga, to Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.90 
 
The argument did not stall the PACE process on excluding Russia. Although 
on January 27 the vote went against exclusion with a majority of 12 votes, 
the Assembly agreed on a new vote to be held in April in anticipation of the 
Council of Europe delegation’s report to the PACE succeeding the January 
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2000 meeting. Yet, Russian officials took a clear stand with regard to warn-
ing the EU and central EU members against going too far on the Chechen 
issue. Germany’s minister of foreign affairs, Joshcka Fischer, travelled to 
Moscow on January 20–21 for talks with Igor Ivanov, during which he 
stressed both the intentions of Germany to pursue a foreign policy line aim-
ing at strengthening the strategic partnership with Russia and concerns over 
the Chechen campaign. Fischer also had talks with Putin, during which the 
acting president gave a detailed account of the federal authorities’ intentions 
in Chechnya, while pointing to the counter-productive policy of the EU to 
“cut down on cooperation in order to exercise pressure on Russia.”91 
In sum, Russia landed on addressing the EU directly on the issue, while 
at the same time opening for a dialogue with the Union on equal terms. De-
nouncing the PACE decision in January as biased, Russian authorities main-
tained that “decisions and recommendations are made on the basis of unilat-
eral assessments which, if implemented, may have a negative affect on the 
state of relations between Russia and the EU.”92 Moreover: 
 
By consistently speaking in favor of enhanced mutually advantageous and equal 
cooperation with the European Union, we proceed from the assumption that this 
is not only a strategic goal that we have chosen, but also an objective tendency in 
the development of the modern world […] The Russian side believes that it is 
improper to link differences over political issues to trade and economic relations. 
This mode of action is fraught for the European Union with damage, which 
would be no smaller than that sustained by Russia, the latter having to respond in 
kind.93  
3.2.2. Relating to the EU: The Lisbon Meeting 
In sum, EU diplomacy did not effectively alter Russia’s priorities in combat-
ing terrorism, nor did it seem to affect Russia’s OSCE strategy. Moscow 
disputed the linkage of trade issues with human rights and the suggestion 
that the Council of Europe should be linked institutionally to the OSCE re-
flected the proposal of making the OSCE the central forum for security is-
sues.  
Moreover, the EU was not perceived as an actor that should have a say in 
internal security issues in Russia.  The clear-cut refusal of linking economic 
trade issues to “political issues” suggested that Moscow would respond to 
any shift of policies within the EU. On the other hand, it also revealed that 
Moscow saw the EU as an important economic actor. Around the Lisbon 
meeting between the EU troika, the US and Russia in March 2000 these pri-
orities were made explicitly by Russian diplomatic officials. First, Russia 
saw the EU as a separate actor in the sense that the Union might represent an 
interesting interlocuter. Hence, the Russian part clearly attached certain 
hopes to the trilateral US-Russia-EU meeting in Lisbon on March 2–3. Rus-
sian press outlets suggested that the triangle meeting should become a regu-
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lar affair, and stressed the Portuguese chairmanship’s messages that Russia 
was to be considered an important discussant in European affairs.  
Secondly, Russian diplomats continued to stress the seeds of economic 
interdependence they found between Russia and the Union and the impor-
tance of using the full specter of the PCA for Russian business circles. 
Hence, the EU constituted an option for Russian business circles that was 
considered important by Russian policy-makers, not least since Putin had 
stressed the economic revival of Russia as the primary aim for the future 
presidency.94  
The leader of the Russian delegation to the EU, Vasiliy Likhachev, elabo-
rated extensively on these issues in Nezavisimaya gazeta. According to him, 
exclusion from the PACE would imply a setback in promising relations and 
yet – reconsidering the CSR and TACIS could not be interpreted as sanc-
tions, the diplomat maintained. Russia was more concerned about the more 
serious measures that were considered in the Commission – such as a 12 
percent tax barrier on Russian scrap metal.95 On the other hand, the diplomat 
maintained that the EU would not introduce sanctions on energy and gas de-
liverances, since most agreements were made for a 3–5-year period, and 
since the EU was too dependent on Russian imports to consider sanctions.  
In the upshot, the diplomat focused on two major areas for future EU–
Russia cooperation: economy and global security and disarmament.96 First, 
the diplomat stated that the institutionalized cooperation with the EU was 
useful as a means to overcome trade differences through negotiations. Sec-
ondly, the partnership had a larger component – as the Lisbon meeting had 
established a new “diplomatic configuration” – Russia, the EU and US. Fol-
lowing in this vein, the diplomat suggested that the EU-Russia relationship 
should be centered on the following issues:  
 
Among the more concrete examples is the cooperation between Russia and the 
EU within the field of destruction of WMD and disarmament. The EU adopted a 
special program on this December 17, 1999.[…] Another interesting project ais 
cooperation in space. Moreover, in the political field it is of importance to pro-
long the Common Strategy on Russia.97 
 
Hence, Russian diplomats did not see possible EU sanctions as outlined 
above as any significant punitive measure with regard to Russia. Moreover, 
the pronounced interest in activating the PCA was also stressed in an internal 
political dimension. Deputy minister of foreign affairs, Ivan Ivanov, stressed 
in March 2000 that Russia’s foreign policies had to become more focused on 
economic relations. Fusing foreign policy interests with business interests, 
among other things by bringing out information on Russia’s international 
trade agreements to business circles, should be a central focus. 
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Trade in the European direction serves as a locomotive in this respect. This is 
why the EU refrained from adopting sanctions against us with regard to Chech-
nya. Also the Union of Russian businessmen and entrepreneurs, the Congress of 
national producers and the European business congress, which unites European 
companies that work on the Russian market, spoke against sanctions.98 
 
Did this imply that Russia in any way would support the EU as an independ-
ent actor to counter what increasingly had been considered in military circles 
as US unilateralism in disarmament issues and also European security?99 
Clearly, Russia’s security and foreign policy doctrines had repeated the fact 
that Russia opposed NATO centrism in Europe and that Russia was curious 
about the development of the ESDP. On the other hand, the new administra-
tion had de-frozen relations with NATO in February 2000 and hence re-
turned to the pre-Kosovo period in NATO–Russia relations and also linked 
up to the transatlantic dimension. During the visit of Secretary-General 
Robertson, Russia and NATO had agreed to resume contacts bilaterally 
within the framework of the Founding Act and the PJC.100 The joint declara-
tion from the meeting reflected the common dedication of the parties to the 
UN Charter and the OSCE Charter, which by and large met Russian con-
cerns. 
Moreover, at a bilateral visit to Britain, Putin had similarly made a re-
mark that membership in NATO was not excluded. Speaking to BBC, Putin 
answered the question of whether he considered NATO and enemy with: 
“Russia is part of the European culture. And I cannot imagine my own coun-
try in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world. So it 
is hard for me to visualize NATO as an enemy. I think even posing the ques-
tion this way will not do any good to Russia or the world.” In the upshot, 
Putin answered the question of possible Russian membership of NATO with: 
“I don't see why not. I would not rule out such a possibility – but I repeat – if 
and when Russia's views are taken into account as those of an equal part-
ner.”101 
Still, conservatives were opposed to an unconditional rapprochement be-
tween NATO and Russia. Head of the section for foreign relations in the 
MOD, Leonid Ivashov wrote in Nezavisimaya gazeta that “a possible de-
freezing of NATO–Russia relations seems imminent, and Moscow has a 
keen interest in a constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation in 
Europe, but not in an unconditional surrender into the arms of the alli-
ance.”102 Similarly, when speaking about Russia’s new foreign policy con-
cept, Igor Ivanov suggested that although a de-freezing of relations with 
NATO was under way, Russia still would “continue to convince our partners 
in NATO that the course of further enlargement is non-productive.” In Mos-
cow parlance, this was synonymous with the creation of “ new security 
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zones and cannot be conceived as anything but directed against Russia’s in-
terests.”103 
Conditionality seemed to be at play also in the issue of the Balkans. 
Commenting on the Kosovo crisis one year after the campaign started, Igor 
Ivanov argued that Russia had altered its security concept as a consequence 
of NATO’s actions, and that future peace could only be built on “multipolar-
ity and the strict observance of international norms.”104 Echoing what Allen 
C. Lynch has analyzed as a core priority for Russia on the Balkans – to pre-
serve contacts with the major European powers through the Contact Group – 
Ivanov stated that NATO action had “cancelled the efforts of the Contact 
Group to find a political solution to the crisis.”105 
The latter comment is indicative as to understanding Russia’s continued 
ambivalence vis-à-vis the Western security system. As argued above, Rus-
sia’s preference for the OSCE was by and large dictated by the fact that Rus-
sia was an equal member. Moreover, by spring 2000 the Contact Group was 
the single most important forum for Russia on the Balkans, and Russia had 
no effective security dialogue with the EU. Yet, the extensive focus on the 
ESDP certainly harbored a more defined interest in how the EU would de-
velop its policies in the region. By March 2000, however, the “NATO-
centrist” approach and the issue of avoiding this on the European continent 
shaped Russian concerns over the situation in the Balkans. The Russian posi-
tion boiled down to stating that NATO action had created a regional conflict, 
which overlapped with Russian concerns on the southern brim of Russia.  
Russia was hence actively lobbying the concern that extensive focus on 
NATO would undermine possible cooperative relations with the EU. More-
over, Russian concerns seemed to tally with the overriding perspective of 
declining institutional powers. By resuming the dialogue with NATO and 
voicing a positive interest in the development of the ESDP, Russia sought to 
define a European vector in foreign policies that aimed at gaining access to 
European and transatlantic institutions.  
Yet, the perspective of damage limitation was also present in the condi-
tional approach to NATO and the more unconditional cooperative, open and 
transparent policy vis-à-vis Europe. Although the normalization of relations 
with NATO worked strongly in the direction of reparing the relationship to 
Europe and the West in the post-Kosovo situation, Russia balanced Euro-
pean and transatlantic institutions against one another by signalizing prefer-
ence for the EU’s security dimension and some reluctance vis-à-vis NATO. 
Voicing Russian membership in NATO did not necessarily contradict this 
policy, but could be interpreteted as a move to open up a dialogue with 
Europe on security issues with the aim of strengthening the European pillar 
in NATO. Signalizing a cooperative stance with NATO was at any rate 
closely linked to the overriding priority of commiting NATO to the OSCE 
framework, thereby avoiding another Kosovo.  
In sum, Russia addressed several aspects of the EU’s foreign and security 
capacitities and recognized that the EU was an ermerging and important 
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arena. The Russian president had still to shape his foreign policy in Europe. 
This policy was conducted at two levels, first and foremost bilaterally, and, 
after that, in multilateral frameworks.  
3.3. Inviting Europe: Putin on the Fore 
After the inauguration ceremony in May 2000, Putin assumed the role as 
full-fledged foreign policy-maker in the European context in late May and 
early June 2000. The schedule was exhausting. According to the official an-
nouncement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EU–Russia summit 
would take place on May 29, the bilateral meeting between US and Russia 
on June 3–4 and Putin planned to visit Italy as the first country after a bilat-
eral meeting with the US on June 4–5.106 Moreover, Igor Ivanov was sched-
uled to meet with NATO officials in Florence within the framework of PJC 
on May 25, 2000, immediately succeeding the meeting of Heads of State of 
CIS in Minsk.107 Putin would visit Spain on June 13–14, and Germany on 
June 15–16.108 
If assuming that Russia approached the European arena from the position 
of a challenger, it seems clear that the timing of Putin’s European tour pro-
vided the newly elected president with an opportunity to voice concerns with 
US plans to continue on the NMD in abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The 
MFA’s official position with regard to the issue was that it was not on the 
bilateral agenda, and hence it had to be raised by the US unilaterally.109 On 
the other hand, Russia’s official position on the specific issue had been 
shaped by the ratification of the START II agreement, which included a 
clause on preservation of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone in strategic sta-
bility.  
On the other hand, Putin had a realistic approach to strategic issues and 
did not seek to maximize Russia’s profits internationally.110 According to 
Yuri Fedorov, Russia’s president told members of the Duma on April 14 that 
Russia would risk a devastating new arms race if denying ratification. If 
Russia embarked on this policy, it would imply: 
 
[…] the destruction of the whole system of arms control agreements and initiate 
a new arms race that will be excessive and – I would like to emphasize that – ab-
solutely superfluous for Russia.111 
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The central point was that Moscow seemed to be interested in how disarma-
ment issues were voiced in the European context. Hence, the Florence meet-
ing on May 25, 2000 reverberated in the Russian press as one where “Euro-
pean concerns” had been voiced out.  Russian press outlets quoted Joshka 
Fischer’s as to having stated that NATO allies could accept NMD only if an 
agreement on amending the ABM Treaty was reached with Russia, and there 
was made an explicit link between amending the ABM and continuing on 
opening the START III, and that both the US and Russia would go further 
down on reducing the nuclear stock as a “common European position.”112 
The timing of the EU–Russia meeting was also given a certain effect. 
Clearly, the EU had stepped down from the critical posture on Chechnya and 
greeted the emergence of a new relationship between Russia and the EU. 
Chairman of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, promoted this view 
in an article, which was published in Russian in Nezavisimaya gazeta on 
May 26.113 Prodi considered the EU–Russia event as significant, not only as 
a logic consequence of the Russian president’s obligation to continue re-
forms, but also his “adherence to European ideals.”114 As for the timing of 
the event, before that of the bilateral US–Russia meeting, Prodi claimed: “we 
should grab this unique possibility with both hands and create a comprehen-
sive dialogue between Russia and the European Union.”115  
The bilateral EU–Russia talks on May 29 proceeded in the vein that the 
EU had become an important interlocutor for Russia. Putin repeated that 
Russia would stay a European country “geographically, culturally and con-
cerning the level of economic integration.”116 Moreover, the meeting report-
edly took place in an atmosphere of relief, since the Chechen issue no longer 
dominated the agenda. The Russian press suggested as much, in claiming 
that “talks were not about Chechnya, but on investments.”117 Although the 
Chechen issue had been raised at the summit, it had clearly been overshad-
owed by other priorities and issues.  
The bilateral meeting with the US on June 4, 2000 proceeded on talks on 
disarmament and non-proliferation. On the eve of the summit, Russia’s posi-
tion was clear: Russia would not accept a unilateral abrogation of the ABM 
Treaty. The Russian side had in this respect not given “the slightest of rea-
sons to doubt that this position was a tough one” to the extent that Russia 
would not even accept an adaptation of the ABM Treaty.118 Russia was, ac-
cording to press reports, offering the US cooperation on missile defense. 
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Moreover, in the event of a unilateral abrogation, Russia would consider 
leaving existing treaties on nuclear disarmament.  
 The visit produced little in terms of agreements on the future of the 
ABM Treaty, but resulted still in a Joint Memorandum, in which both parties 
declared their common concern for preserving “strategic stability in the nu-
clear field” and continue the talks on START III in accordance with the Joint 
Memorandum of the presidents in Moscow 1998 and Cologne 1999. More-
over, the Joint Memorandum offered a rather detailed point on non-
proliferation, according to which the parties: 
 
[…] agree that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat 
from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deliv-
erance, including missiles and missile technology, and underline their efforts to 
reverse this process, among other things by means of utilizing existing and new 
international legal mechanisms. They agree that this new threat potentially im-
plies considerable changes in the strategic situation in the field of international 
security.119 
 
The summit also resulted in a bilateral agreement between the US and Rus-
sia on the creation of a Joint Center for early Warning in Moscow. The par-
ties agreed to utilize the period from June 2000 to June 2001 to prepare for 
the establishment of this center. According to preliminary plans, the US 
should send 16 civilians and military staff, while Russia provided 81. Its 
main function should be to secure exchange of information about ballistic 
missile launches and cosmic missile launchers.120 
The bilateral meeting between the US and Russian presidents was imme-
diately succeeded by Putin’s visit to Rome for bilateral talks with the Italian 
government. Although announced in the Russian press as a working visit, 
Russia’s president made what was referred to as a surprising announcement 
that Russia, the EU and NATO should join forces to create a joint anti-
missile defense for Europe.121 According to press reports, Putin apparently 
wanted Italy to serve as an intermediary for this idea and consult with other 
European capitals. Moreover, the president took the offensive on the issue of 
preserving the ABM Treaty by declaring that he was aware of the European 
concerns about the future of the ABM Treaty. He declared officially: 
 
We know that many in Europe and Northern America and the world are con-
cerned about the preservation of the ABM Treaty from 1972. We share this con-
cern […] I have proposed for the chairman of the Italian government that he con-
sider and discuss with other colleagues the Russian proposal to establish, to-
gether with Europe and NATO, a joint anti-missile system for Europe. Of course 
also with the participation of our American partners.122 
 
Press reports made timing an issue in itself. Putin’s entrance onto the arena 
of European politics was made an event by the fact that the new president of 
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Russia had consulted with the EU at the summit of EU–Russia on May 29 
before meeting bilaterally with the US. The Italian follow-up was hence able 
to “transcend the field of bilateral relations.”123 Indeed, the return visit to It-
aly gave Putin a possibility to combine Russian policy priorities in a “Euro-
pean” setting. By inviting the US to participate in a European missile de-
fense, to which Russia took the initiative, Moscow could hope to gain certain 
dividends. 
The objective of addressing European concerns was repeated on the suc-
ceeding visit to Germany. Indeed, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, 
Ivanov, had announced in anticipation of the meeting that “Germany is for 
Russia the largest window to the European Union.”124 Putin repeated this 
priority during the press conference summarizing the outcome of the visit. 
According to Russia’s president, “Germany is the single most important 
economic partner of Russia in Europe. We relate to Germany as to the core 
of European integration.”125 Among the concerns voiced in the press in an-
ticipation of the meeting, was the fact that Germany and France had met bi-
laterally before the meeting and coordinated their positions with regard to 
the future of the EU and the production of a European military transport air-
craft, which would bury Russian hopes on the joint Russian-Ukrainian pro-
posal to produce the AN-70 military transport carrier for Germany and other 
NATO countries.126  
During the meeting Putin re-launched the issue of strategic stability. Dur-
ing the consultations in which Gerhard Schroeder voiced the opinion that 
consultations should continue within the PJC and bilaterally, Putin made a 
reverse proposal by inviting Germany as a third party in the proposed bilat-
eral US-Russian Early-Warning Center in Moscow. “I proposed to the Ger-
man Chancellor that he consult with his European partners, and that Russia 
would like to see United Europe as a third party in this agreement.” More-
over: 
 
After our proposal to NATO that it consider the creation of a joint MD for 
Europe, we have heard positive response from the US on this during my recent 
meeting with US Minister of defense William Cohen, and also from other Euro-
pean leaders.127 
 
Putin’s tour in Europe offered little in terms of institutional dividends for 
Russia. Yet, the repeated efforts to make the European voice in strategic is-
sues more salient served at least the purpose of making the EU more impor-
tant as an actor, and hence it fitted neatly with the overriding “multipolar” 
vision of Russia’s foreign and security policies. By proposing consultations 
on a European missile defense and voicing concerns over the ABM Treaty 
Putin addressed Europe as a separate entity to the extent that he wanted to 
see a “pan-European” presence in a trilateral construction involving the US, 
Russia and the EU. From the perspective of decline in institutional powers 
this could offer some long-term dividends and compensate for Russia’s lim-
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ited possibilities of influencing European security policies. Moreover, in the 
damage limitation perspective, a trilateral configuration of the EU, US and 
Russia would imply that the European security process was preserved as an 
open-ended one.  
This is in itself not sufficient, however, to support the notion that Russia 
approached Europe as a challenger. In order to find support for this argu-
ment, we should examine two aspects. First, we should look into the propos-
als made in NATO and the defense minister’s interpretation of Putin’s pro-
posal. Secondly, we should consider domestic interpretations of Putin’s 
European policies. 
3.3.1. Russia’s EuroMD proposal and Transatalanticism 
At the PJC meeting on June 8, 2000, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev 
specified Putin’s EuroMD proposal in more concrete forms. Sergeyev de-
parted from general confidence-building measures initiated to overcome a 
new division of Europe. The Russian minister linked together several issues. 
First, he assumed that the Russian proposal could serve as a means to over-
come differences that otherwise might seem to play a role if insofar as 
Europe derived its position on MD not from “common European interests”, 
meaning that if the European NATO allies supported a US position on the 
issue, the Russian side would have to ask against whom the MD was to be 
directed.128  
Secondly, the Russian side proposed a list of possible areas of coopera-
tion with NATO. The list included measures such as: conduct a common 
evaluation of the character and scale of proliferation of missile technology 
and possible missile threats; elaborate a joint concept for EuroMD; create a 
joint all-European multilateral center for early warning; conduct joint HQ 
operative exercises; conduct joint research; jointly elaborate a system of 
non-strategic MD; elaborate a joint non-strategic MD for coordinated actions 
within peacekeeping.129 
This list of proposals was coupled with what seemed to be a conditional 
approach to resuming the dialogue between NATO and Russia. Sergeyev 
maintained: 
 
It is clear that the re-establishment of contacts between Moscow and NATO can 
only proceed step by step and by keeping a focus on prioritized areas. A subse-
quent widening of the agenda will only be possible insofar as Russia’s interests 
are taken into account.130 
 
Clearly, the Russian minister – although presenting the issue in NATO – still 
looked for a European position on strategic issues. Elaborating on the issue 
in Nezavisimaya gazeta on June 22, Russia’s position was set on preserving 
the ABM Treaty, and Sergeyev also dismissed allegations that Russia would 
be willing to accept an adaptation of the Treaty. Hence, the clause in the 
Joint Declaration that allegedly opened for such an adaptation, given 
“changes in the strategic situation”, was not to be interpreted as to suggest-
                                                     
128  “Sergeyev konkretisiroval initsiativy Putina v oblasti PRO”, NeGa, June 10, 2000.  
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
Geir Flikke 
nupi december 03 
38 
ing that Russia would support this. “Our position is as earlier,” Sergeyev 
stated. “Any changes in the strategic situation should not undermine the es-
sence of this document, and should be directed only at strengthening the 
ABM Treaty.”131  
Most importantly, the article gave insights as to Russia’s European poli-
cies. Judging from the article, Russia had pinned its hopes on two factors: 
First, that the “transatlantic partners come to realize that the abrogation of 
the ABM Treaty will lead to a sharp change of the political climate in the 
world.”132 Secondly, that European states would respond to the invitation to 
join in a Common European Early Warning Center. To the latter respect 
Sergeyev claimed that: “no one desire to become a hostage of the egoistic 
plans of the Americans. The defense ministers of France and Germany have 
pointedly made this position. This situation strengthens our position.”133 
How did these priorities spell out with regard to the transatlantic agenda? 
First, the idea behind a joint Early Warning Center as sketched bilaterally 
between Russia and US in June was – according to Sergeyev – “not to unite 
the warning systems of Russia and the US, nor to unite systems of anti-
missile defense, as some incompetent media have suggested.” The aim was 
rather that the US and Russia should involve European partners. Secondly, 
Russia’s minister stressed the idea of a European MD, which should not be 
set up to the detriment of the ABM Treaty.134 As the Russian proposal 
spelled out, it was more to be consultation on possible joint action and re-
search. Hence, a non-strategic MD should consist of: 
 
Joint assessments of the character and scale of missile proliferation and possible 
missile threats; jointly elaborate an pan-European non-strategic MD system; 
jointly establish an pan-European multilateral Early Warning center for missile 
launches; joint command exercises and joint experiments and research.135 
 
These statements suggest that the context of the proposal was one of making 
the European voice within the Alliance more salient. Also the domestic con-
text interpreted Putin’s European tour to this end.  
3.3.2. Domestic and Foreign Policy Interpretations of Putin’s Tour 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the State Duma also engaged widely in 
the debate on sculpting Russia’s position. A round-table was held in June 
2000 under the overarching title: “How should we respond to the US?”136 
Participants departed from the assumption that the US would, regardless of 
the Russian ratification of START II and the CTBT, still leave the ABM 
Treaty unilaterally, but were split in their view on how to respond. Members 
of the parliamentary apparatus wavered between supporting the US democrat 
position, and leave all treaties from the ABM, START I, START II, the 
CTBT and other agreements.  
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The position of Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, is worth some attention. Rogozin contended that the US was moving 
towards isolationism, and that Cold War deterrence was about to be replaced 
by a unipolar system where the US would rank national security as an over-
riding priority. Combining this with Russia’s attempt not to become the 
scapegoat in the discourse of disarmament, and Europe’s increased signifi-
cance for Russia, Rogozin stated: 
 
We were absolutely correct to ratify START II. Hence we effectively foresaw 
the plans of the US to leave the ABM Treaty. What would have happened if we 
did not ratify? The US would still leave the treaty, but this time we would be to 
blame. […] Now the US is guilty not only in the face of us, but in the face of the 
whole world and the process of disarmament. […] What about the Europeans? 
The last parliamentary seminar with French and Germans revealed that their po-
sition is quite close to the Russian one. For the first time in NATO history, the 
Americans have created a situation of unequally distributed security, which 
might lead to elements of discord in the future.137 
 
Lengthy quotations like the one above might reveal how Russia sculpted the 
marker “Europe” in the internal debate. Although Rogozin maintained that 
Russia should still approach the US through dialogue and not withdraw from 
any of the ratified treaties, he interpreted future US unilateralist positions as 
favorable with respect to Russia’s future voice in Europe.  
There seems to be ample evidence to suggest that Russia’s active Europe 
policy was designed and interpreted as a means to engage European capitals. 
Other internal sources back this assumption.  Putin’s move was considered a 
shrewd effort to avoid a continuation of the Yeltsin line of back-pedalling on 
lost positions in the European security system. Commenting on Putin’s style 
as foreign policy-maker in Russia, Aleksander Bessmertnykh, former USSR 
minister of foreign affairs, suggested that Putin had taken a “flank maneu-
ver” and thus avoided a repetition of Yeltsin’s earlier hints on the possibility 
of adapting the ABM Treaty. Hence, rather than backtracking on the US 
proposal, he had proposed a different version for discussion: 
 
Some are frustrated that he started to cultivate the Europeans by starting with It-
aly and Spain, which do not play any central role in NATO […] I quite enjoyed 
this flank attack. Entrenching Europe from the flanks, he moved the peripheral 
states to the center of the discussion of vital European security interests. 138 
 
Clearly, Putin had utilized bilateral contacts to flag an idea of an independent 
Europe on the international scene. This was echoed also in Russia’s official 
policies vis-à-vis Europe. Following in this vein, Igor Ivanov stated in a 
speech held at the European Forum in Berlin on November 25, 2000 that 
Europe should take the initiative in disarmament. “Nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation are no longer exclusively a topic for Russia–US relations, 
and other nuclear powers,” Ivanov maintained. Furthermore: 
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Europe should and must become a generator of comprehensive strategic stability 
in the world. First and foremost in order to make cardinal progress in disarma-
ment on the condition of preserving and strengthening existing treaties and ag-
reements in this field. […] It is necessary that the rest of the international com-
munity, European powers included, join in on that process. This theme could be-
come a permanent theme in the trilateral dialogue between Russia, the US, and 
the EU. 139 
 
Summing up, the domestic policy dimensions of Putin’s foreign policies 
suggest that Putin’s moves were basically interpreted in a damage limitation 
perspective. Anticipating that the US would leave the ABM Treaty unilater-
ally, Russian policy-makers pinned their hopes on an independent European 
position on the issue that possibly could manifest itself in a trilateral con-
figuration in international politics. This would in turn serve the overriding 
perspective of keeping an open European process in terms of security. The 
EU was by and large viewed as a possible interlocutor and counterweight to 
US unilateralism. By assigning the EU and Europe actor capacities within 
the field of strategic stability, the multipolar paradigm was confirmed – Rus-
sian policy-makers saw an independent Europe as a potential pole in a sys-
tem of balance. Recpaturing the definition above, it seems clear that engag-
ing in a dialogue with both NATO and the EU on this issue did not contra-
dict the long-term ambitions of damage limitation. Russia was just not being 
specifically romantic about it and stressed that Russian interests had to be 
taken into account.  
As suggested above, this did not materialize in any institutional arrange-
ment. What Russia had with the EU was basically two reciprocal strategies 
and the arrangements of biannual summits and consultations and working 
groups within the framework of the EU–Russia PCA. The EU and Russia 
had no separate institutional framework for addressing security issues. In this 
sense, the May summit between the EU and Russia had reopened the politi-
cal dialogue, but not developed it. The fall of 2000 implied a further devel-
opment of that dialogue, however. 
3.4. The EU as a Security Actor: The Balkans 
Given the importance attached to the EU as an actor in disarmament and 
economy, one should expect that Russia readily saw possibilities for the EU 
to play a more clearly defined security role pursuant to the development of 
the ESDP. Indeed, at the Moscow summit in May 2000, security issues had 
emerged as a point on the EU–Russia agenda. According to the joint state-
ment, President Putin “expressed a positive interest in the EU's evolving 
European Security and Defense Policy”. This statement fell in line with Rus-
sia’s overall strategic perspective of multipolarity and respect for the UN 
Charter. Hence:  
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He [President Putin] noted that there are possibilities for cooperation in accor-
dance with the UN Charter principles and in recognition of the main responsibili-
ties of the UN Security Council, in particular on the issues of strengthening in-
ternational peace, security and stability, notably early warning, conflict preven-
tion, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.140  
 
The central focus for an increased role for the EU was undoubtedly the Bal-
kans. By 2000, multipolarity and UN primacy readily sum up Russia’s main 
priorities in the region. Igor Ivanov had in March 2000 suggested that in the 
Balkans, the struggle for a new world order had entered a final phase and 
that “future peace is possible only on the basis of multipolarity and the strict 
respect for international laws.”141 This had been duly noticed also at the 
Moscow summit in May 2000, where the EU and Russia landed on a com-
mon statement on  “Furthering a settlement in Kosovo on the basis of full 
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1244 and full support for 
the Dayton–Paris accords.”142 This policy was reiterated in many forums. 
Anticipating the UN millennium meeting in the fall of 2000, Igor Ivanov 
voiced support for returning to status quo ante by appealing to strict loyalty 
and abidance by UNSCR 1244. “As is well known,” the minister stated, 
“resolution 1244 includes a clause that Kosovo is an integral part of the terri-
tory of the FRY. In other words, preservation of the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia is a fundamental condition for a solid and long-lasting conflict 
resolution.”143 
Simultaneously, Russia had strategic interests in the region. Igor Ivanov 
contended in a speech to the State Duma on October 13 that the Balkans was 
still ”a region of strategic significance for Russia”, and that the objective of 
Russia’s foreign policies was to create conditions that allowed Russia to 
“strengthen its positions.”144 During the fall of 2000, Russia had tried to de-
fine these strategic interests, among other things by playing a role as arbiter. 
As the crisis of government erupted in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 
September 2000, Moscow tried to gain a role as special mediator. Indeed, 
Putin invited both Milosevic and Kostunica to Moscow for trilateral talks in 
the beginning of October 2000, but in the upshot, Belgrade refused Russian 
intermediate efforts.145 According to minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov, 
Russia tried three times to play a role as intermediary, but had limited suc-
cess.146 Outlining Russia’s policies, Ivanov stressed that Russia’s position 
had been one of consequence and clarity. Russia’s arbiter role was serious in 
intentions. Notably, Russia’s interest in the region was not confined to sup-
porting any of the two parties, but to: 
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Actively foster the strengthening of the democratic foundations of Yugoslav so-
ciety and through this secure our interests in a friendly country. Concretely, Rus-
sia will strive to lift sanctions, help the FRY to return to the scene of interna-
tional politics, support the FRY economically, and help to rebuild the country’s 
economy. 147 
 
With the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Stability Pact on October 26, 2000, it 
seemed clear for Moscow that Russia could not play any separate role in the 
Balkans, let alone an indispensable one. True, Kostunica paid a visit to Mos-
cow on October 27 with a general encouragement that Moscow should play 
a visible role in the Balkans. His statement was rather moderate, however, 
indicating that “in all the criss-crossing strategic and geopolitical influences 
on the Balkans, there should be one element that signalized Russian pres-
ence.”148 Clearly, the commonality of approaches was evident in the empha-
sis put by both leaders on the territorial integrity of the FRY and the need to 
abide by SCR 1244 with regard to the Kosovo issue. On the other hand, the 
president of FRY travelled to Moscow as the leader of a country heading for 
Europe. This was confirmed by Kostunica’s statements that Yugoslavia 
would orientate itself towards the European Union and not Russia or the US 
– a policy that the Russian press referred to as a “return to the policies of 
Tito.”149  
This applies also to other states in the region. During the fall of 2000, 
Russia faced a Balkan setting where the EU and transatlantic structures 
emerged as a reference point for the region. Boris Trajkovski, president of 
Macedonia, had made it clear in the Russian press during the spring of 2000 
that Macedonia “aimed for membership in transatlantic structures”, and that 
Macedonia’s decision to allow NATO forces to use its territory was “an in-
ternal affair of Macedonia.”150 Moreover, at the Zagreb conference in No-
vember 2000 elected leaders of South East Europe joined in with the 15 EU 
countries in mapping the prospects for integrating the region into the EU.151 
To all appearances, Russia’s president did not harbor any illusions on a 
transatlantic rift in the Balkans. On the eve of the EU–Russia summit in 
Paris, Putin stated that it would be “just if NATO countries took onto them-
selves a considerable part of the expenditures in rebuilding former Yugosla-
via, since they decided to embark on a military mission that did substantial 
damage to the Yugoslav economy.”152 The coupling of NATO and the EU 
Stability Pact suggested that these were not conceived as separate entities. 
On the other hand, Russian diplomats signalized an interest in the EU’s 
emerging security identity. Russia’s permanent representative to the Euro-
pean Union, Vasilii Likhachev, had, in anticipation of the Paris summit in 
October 2000, suggested that the EU and Russia should “joint their potential 
in keeping the peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and other problematic 
regions.” In this connection: 
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Considering the fact that the EU is actively formulating its foreign policy and its 
common defense policy, it is mandatory for Russia to know to which degree this 
activity is coherent with the principles and norms of international law, the UN 
Charter and the Declaration of the OSCE. How transparent is this process and 
how can Russia and other countries link on to Petersberg operations in accor-
dance with EU summit decisions in Feira and Helsinki?153 
 
Clearly, Russian officials had at least raised expectations on the development 
of a comprehensive dialogue between the EU and Russia in the security 
sphere. Indeed, according to Likhachev, Russia’s dialogue with the EU in-
cluded “diplomatic talks on questions of disarmament, demilitarization of 
outer space, regional conflicts, human rights and economic security.”154 The 
EU suggested a somewhat narrower agenda on regional stability. Days be-
fore the EU–Russia summit in France, EU’s High Representative on Foreign 
and Security Affairs, Javier Solana, expressed in the Russian press that: 
 
The EU and Russia can through joint efforts give a considerable contribution in 
supporting the efforts of the Serb people to pull through democratic reforms, and 
also in stimulating the intentions of the Serb people to stabilize Serbia and the 
region as such.155 
 
This statement did not suggest anything else than what had been proposed in 
the joint statement of the EU and Russia in May 2000. Yet, the recently de-
ceased Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Anna Lindh, who in 2000 was 
future chairman of the EU troika, maintained in a September issue of Nezav-
isimaya gazeta the opposite of what Javier Solana had stated in March 2000, 
when reluctantly holding back on cooperation with Russia within crisis man-
agement – namely that this field was of special interest in the future coopera-
tion. “There is another aspect concerning security and crisis management,” 
she stated: 
 
The European Union is currently seeing new possibilities in the field of civilian 
and military conflict management. In this field we also count on active support 
from Russia, and on the active participation of Russia in this process.156 
 
Apparently, the EU had developed a more receptive role in terms of cooper-
ating with Russia on issues related to crisis management. This is clear not 
least from the Paris summit, which brought several strands together in a 
common declaration. First, the declaration welcomed the democratization 
process in FRY and the return of FRY to the league of European nations. 
Secondly, Russia’s and the EU’s beginning rapprochement within security 
was solidified by a special declaration on strengthening the dialogue and co-
operation on political and security matters in Europe. According to the 
statement, substance should be given to the strategic partnership by institu-
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tionalizing the security and defense dialogue, develop a strategic dialogue, 
hold regular consultations on disarmament, arms control and non-prolifera-
tion and cooperate in crisis management.157 More specifically, the declara-
tion stated that:  
 
On the basis of the initial proposals, which will be presented at the Nice Euro-
pean Council to enable potential partners in the operations to contribute, we will 
examine mechanisms for contribution by the Russian Federation to the European 
Union's crisis management operations. In the context of preparations for the next 
European Union–Russia Summit, we will draw up proposals designed to give 
substance to our cooperation. We will also examine possibilities for a contribu-
tion by the Russian Federation to the implementation of civilian crisis manage-
ment instruments.158 
 
Apparently, the EU had widened the scope of consultation with Russia sub-
stantially. A major reason for this might have been the ambition to gain ca-
pacities as a security actor in the Balkans. Russia did not counter this devel-
opment. According to Dov Lynch, Russia reversed its Balkan policies by 
taking a “back-seat” in the region during the course of 2000. In this perspec-
tive the “EU has taken the lead with Russia’s tacit consent.”159 In the upshot, 
the Russian–EU dialogue on security issues made a considerable leap for-
ward during the Paris summit and opened for regular consultations on secu-
rity matters.  
This does not imply that Russia refrained from promoting a status quo 
approach to the Balkans. As observed by Michael Emerson, Russia proposed 
to hold a Balkan summit conference during the summer of 2001 to cement 
territorial borders, secure strict abidance by the UN Charter and combat re-
gional extremism and terrorism. This proposal also challenged the EU’s 
policies in the region. According to Russia’s special representative, “it is not 
in our common interest nor is it in the interest of the Balkan states that illu-
sions regarding a possibility of an imposed solution is replaced by another, 
i.e. in the search for a panacea in the shape of speedy integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures.”160 
The situation in the Balkans is central to understanding the background 
for one particular strand of EU–Russia relations – that of security. From the 
perspective of decline in institutional powers, Russia achieved a dialogue 
with the EU on security issues during the latter half of 2000. Clearly, main-
taining a dialogue on these issues did not imply any direct institutional lev-
erage on developments, nor did it imply any parallel arrangement similar to 
the PCA. It does, however, reflect the degree of interest on Russia’s part to 
sculpt and initiate a security dialogue with the EU as a part of a new policy. 
The fact that the summit was in France, dictated a certain focus on security 
affairs, as France since the beginning of European integration had been asso-
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ciated with the idea of a separate defense capability.161 Indeed, before the 
Paris summit Russian officials had underlined several times, among other 
things at the visit of the French minister of foreign affairs, Hubert Vedrine, 
to Moscow in September, that France was an indispensable partner for Rus-
sia.162  
Developing a dialogue with the EU on security did not imply any direct 
investments from Russia’s side, however. Russia anticipated an increased 
security role for the EU and wanted to stay at the forefront of this develop-
ment by initiating a dialogue on security issues. In a damage limitation per-
spective, Russia could, on the contrary, expect certain dividends in terms of 
av open-ended European security process, and one that readily took Russian 
perspectives more into account. 
In sum, the policy moves made during the opening phase of Putin’s ten-
ure suggest that the EU emerged in Russian perceptions as a potential secu-
rity actor, and one that also would have a say in strategic questions and dis-
armament. The basic interpretive frame for the EU’s capacities was still that 
of multipolarity – independent EU capacities would for Russia imply that the 
strategic aim of multipolarity would be reached.  
Was this policy rooted in any substantial change in perceptions with re-
gard to Russia’s understanding of the Western security system? The next 
chapter seeks to highlight the internal Russian debate on the Western secu-
rity system and link various perceptions of Russia’s options to the interpre-
tive approaches of damage limitation and decline in institutional powers.  
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4. Debating Europe: The EU and NATO in Russia’s Security 
Debate Prior to September 11 
The aim of this chapter is not to indicate any causal link between the policies 
adopted by the Putin administration in the first part of 2000 and various pol-
icy-making perceptions of the EU, nor to suggest that there is any inevitable 
link between perceptions and foreign policies at a more theoretical level. The 
aim is more modestly to analyze various perceptions of the Western security 
system in relation to the overall perspectives of damage limitation and de-
cline in institutional powers. The chapter starts off by debating Russia’s po-
sitions on the development of the OSCE as a pan-European organization, 
and to which degree cooperation with the EU harmonized with Russia’s pri-
ority to preserve the organization. After this, the NATO–EU nexus will be 
discussed and focus will be put on whether or not researchers viewed the EU 
as an alternative to NATO, or simply as an integral part of the future devel-
opment of a European and transatlantic crisis management capacity. Thirdly, 
the chapter discusses the development of the debate on Russia–EU relations 
on the ESDP and future crisis management operations.  
4.1. The OSCE–EU Nexus: Preferred Partner? 
Russia made substantial progress in developing the security dialogue with 
the EU in 2000 and 2001. Still, the major outlook on the Western security 
arrangement remained colored by Russia’s position during the Kosovo crisis. 
Decline in institutional powers was a primary concern. In early 2001, Rus-
sia’s minister of foreign affairs expressed concerns that the OSCE was 
gradually becoming less important, and stressed that in order to gain signifi-
cance, the organization had to reform deeply and become more of a pan-
European organization with equal access for all members.  Clearly, Russia 
both feared and did not support the marginalization of the OSCE in Europe. 
In this respect, Igor Ivanov stated in November 2000 in a speech held to the 
“European Forum” in Berlin that: 
 
In order for Europe to become a moving force in the formation of a multipolar 
system of international relations, Europe must become a powerful and self-
sufficient “pole.” And this is possible – and this is my deep conviction – only if 
Europe is transformed into a unified space for stability and security, economic 
growth and democracy.163 
 
This line indicated continuity with Primakov’s foreign policies in so far as it 
pictured Europe as an independent pole in the international system. Follow-
ing in this vein, Ivanov maintained: “the OSCE should become the primary 
forum for developing a unified approach from the part of European powers 
to fundamental contemporary problems, and also a primary mechanism for 
dialogue with other regional security organizations.”164 The suggestion that 
the OSCE should be a “primary mechanism” illustrates the central tenet of 
the Primakovian approach – European security should develop under the 
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guidance of the OSCE to the extent that the OSCE should coordinate other 
security institutions. 
Still, Moscow seemed to have modified the suggestion that the OSCE 
should serve as the only viable alternative to other Western security institu-
tions. Indeed, Igor Ivanov maintained that “the attempt to contrast the OSCE 
with other European institutions with a limited number of participants and to 
make this organization the sole fundament of European security are counter-
productive.”165 Hence, what Moscow anticipated was first and foremost that 
the OSCE should be a forum for security pluralism – an architecture consist-
ing of a variety of interlocking or independent security arrangements on the 
European continent.  
This idea was still salient in the internal security debate, and served as a 
background for interpreting what Russian officials perceived as a stalemate 
within the OSCE. Linking up to the EU was perceived as a possible exit so-
lution for Russia’s declining institutional powers. Former ambassador to the 
US and deputy chairman of the State Duma, Vladimir Lukin, envisaged the 
emerging EU–Russia relationship as a move beyond the deadlock that had 
developed within the OSCE after the Istanbul summit in 1999. In his view, 
the OSCE had in a sense polarized during the summit as the European part 
increasingly interpreted the Charter’s clause on not allowing exclusive 
spheres of interests and exclusive mandates on peacekeeping as “denouncing 
the principle practiced by Russia of seeing the CIS sphere as one of exclu-
sive interests.”166 Russia was on the other hand utilizing this as an argument 
against increased “NATO centrism” in Europe. Hence: 
 
Russia has urged to widen the scope of the OSCE and give it an actual pan-
European character, whereas the countries of NATO have sought to narrow the 
organization’s function to a minimum, and focus by and large on the conflicts in 
post-Soviet states and in the Balkans.167 
 
This policy was highly visible in the many statements made by Igor Ivanov 
on developments within the OSCE – allegedly that the organization was 
turning into a “vehicle for forced democratization of the post-Soviet 
space.”168 The essence of this argument touched upon that of Lukin above, 
namely that the OSCE stood in danger of being narrowed down to the human 
dimension of security and the concept of humanitarian intervention, while 
other security issues were confined to organizations where Russia was not 
represented.  
What is interesting about Lukin’s analysis is that he singles out the EU as 
a completely new actor and partner for Russia, and possibly also a way out 
of the negative status quo situation. “The new Russian administration justly 
considers the EU and not NATO to be its primary interlocutor,” he main-
tained on the anniversary of the OSCE Istanbul meeting. Moreover: 
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By proposing to widen and strengthen the structures of the permanent EU-Russia 
dialogue [….] Russia supports the Finnish proposal on a trilateral summit be-
tween Russia, the EU and the US […] Such a European security architecture that 
harmonizes bilateral relations with the cooperation between various international 
organizations (UN, OSCE, EU, WEU, NATO, CE, CIS and so forth) would not 
only secure stability on the continent, but also serve as a pattern for other regions 
in the multipolar world of the XXI century.169 
 
This analysis brought the Primakovian approach to a new level in so far as it 
did not harbor any illusions of the primacy of the OSCE in Europe. Rather 
than assuming that the OSCE should have a coordinating role with regard to 
the development of the EU’s security identity, Lukin recognized the EU as a 
more distinct foreign policy actor, and pictured this as a process that eventu-
ally should affect Russia as well. Hence, Lukin suggested that this dialogue 
could only develop in substance on three conditions: First, the EU had to 
make more explicit what the ESDP was actually all about; secondly, the US 
had to overcome its own inherent tendency to “unipolarism” and, thirdly, 
Russia would become a stable part of this triangle in so far as Russia proved 
that “the European direction is not only a concept, but a genuine political 
orientation”.170 
 
Russia has no less of a claim to have a “separate identity” than the US and the 
EU – but only within the framework of a long-term collective security strategy 
for the triangle.171 
 
Although going beyond the Primakovian paradigm in the sense that counter-
balancing US influence was not an option, the search for a triangular con-
figuration harbored at least a suggestion that Russia should be considered an 
equal partner. Moreover, Lukin’s triangular configuration followed the am-
bition of Moscow from the Lisbon meeting and onwards to initiate a dia-
logue on strategic disarmament issues and security with the US and the EU. 
By supporting what was conceived as a “Finnish option”, Lukin saw an al-
ternative to the OSCE for Russia and some alternative collective security ar-
rangement for the triangle. 
Such assertions found backing also in other policy-making environments. 
Yet, the official position of Moscow seemed somewhat reluctant to adopt 
such a strategy in its full scope. Two fundamental positions deserve some 
treatment: First, the status quo approach – that the OSCE should be up-
graded, modernized and made more effective on the condition that the or-
ganization still remained the only truly pan-European security organization. 
Secondly, the assertion that Russia’s policies of upgrading the OSCE had 
been an ineffective one, and – in the words of some researchers – a forum 
first and foremost for Russian back-pedalling from lost positions in the 
European security debate. 
The first view was frequently launched by conservative research envi-
ronments in discussions dedicated to the future relationship between the EU 
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and Russia.  Hence, in connection with a May 2001 conference at the Insti-
tute of Europe, the director of the MFA department on relations with the EU, 
Vladimir Ovsyannikov, stated that although Russia “objectively appreciate 
the development [of the ESDP]”, and the direction of Russia’s foreign poli-
cies “coincides with the major objectives of the common foreign and secu-
rity policies of the EU”, Russia still had to conclude: 
 
We believe that the military component of EU’s policies in the field of security 
and defense should be organically inscribed into the existing system of European 
institutions, with the aim of strengthening the pan-European security architecture 
and avoid a shattering of its foundations. First and foremost, this implies to con-
firm the fundamental role of the OSCE.172 
 
Similar assertions worked as to confirm not only the prevalent post-Kosovo 
mood in Russian security thinking, but also a more deeply rooted status quo 
thinking as to conceptualizing the EU as an actor. Hence, the director of the 
Russian Institute of Europe, Nikolay Shmelev, suggested that although the 
EU was a preferred partner for Russia in regional and global affairs, the Un-
ion still harbored certain negative dependencies that projected on to the Rus-
sian sphere of interests. These “negative dependencies” had made them-
selves known as: 
 
NATO enlargement, the events in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the un-
dermining US policies in the Caucasus and Central-Asia – all of these reveal that 
the weight and influence of the EU can be and are utilized against Russia’s inter-
ests.173 
 
Other analysts underlined the importance of addressing the ESDP actively in 
order to avoid further back-pedalling on lost positions vis-à-vis the Western 
security system. To be sure, the fundamental rationale for entering into a 
more structured dialogue with the EU in security matters should, according 
to these assessments, be to emerge as more proactive, and less linked to the 
status quo position on the OSCE. First and foremost, this approach harbored 
few illusions as to Russia’s capacity and ability to counter the enlarging 
Western security system. According to Dmitry Danilov and Arkady Moshes, 
Russia’s OSCE policies had been “illusive” to this end. It proved ineffective 
in stalling NATO enlargement, and would be ineffective as to dealing with 
the ESDP. Hence: 
 
Russia continues to live by illusions and defends a hierarchic system of security 
with the OSCE at the top of the pyramid. Whereas the West has chosen a clearly 
defined strategy, Russia has chosen what is really a blind alley. The Russian pro-
posals are excluded from the sphere of practical policies, basically due to lacking 
support from the majority of OSCE countries, while the declamatory defense of 
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these positions has narrowed Russia’s room for direction and possible access to 
other forms of collective security organizations in Europe.174 
 
The analysts’ points were centered on the fact that Russia, by pursuing a se-
lective approach and trying to give preference to separate organizations 
really neglected the fact that the Western security fabric constituted an in-
separable network of various institutions. Russia would, if pursuing the 
overall line of giving preference to the OSCE, remain marginalized in the 
Western security system and have little access to its internal fabric.  
Interestingly, these analysts also attached great importance to what 
Vladimir Lukin had referred to as the Finnish initiative above – to conduct 
trilateral meetings between the US, the EU and Russia. Clearly, this ap-
proach was coupled to the notion that “Russia could, by striking a partner-
ship with the EU/WEU to a certain degree compensate for insufficient rela-
tions with the West in the sphere of security.” In this vein: 
 
Russia officially supported Finland’s proposal on conducting a trilateral summit 
‘Russia–EU–US’. With the start of the ‘Lisbon process’ (the first trilateral meet-
ing of ministers from Russia–EU–US took place on March 3, 2000 in Lisbon) a 
new format for Russian–Western dialogue was opened.175 
 
Hence, it seemed that many analysts considered the “troika” format to be a 
worthy substitute for the organization that in the words of Moshes and 
Danilov had declined in importance after the Cold War.176 Clearly, this did 
not imply that the analysts did not see the OSCE as still relevant. Russia had 
at Istanbul made European states see more clearly that the OSCE should be 
based on consensus and non-violence in resolving conflicts. To the latter 
end, Russia had, in their view, “to a certain extent succeeded if not in limit-
ing the tendency towards ‘NATO centrism’ in Europe, then at least in avoid-
ing certain dangerous ‘landing operations’ similar to actions in Kosovo.”177 
Yet, the emphasis on the trilateral context was interesting for analysts and 
politicians alike as it anticipated a situation that would emerge as a product 
of EU enlargement and closer integration. In this respect, the “European 
channels may to a certain extent fill up the deficit of relations between the 
West and Russia in the field of security, and even enrich the actual content 
of this relationship.”178  
The search for a triangular security configuration in Europe was clearly 
linked to the perspective of decline in institutional powers. First, researchers 
and policy-makers assumed that the OSCE was a lost arena for Russia, and 
that new institutional designs had to be fronted. Secondly, the assumption 
that the EU would fill up the institutional void in Russia’s relationship to the 
West harbored a long-term ambition to find some arrangement with the EU 
that would link Russia closer to Western security institutions. 
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Focus on the EU included also perspectives derived from damage limita-
tion. By suggesting the EU as a preferred partner for Russia, and one that 
softened the cool relationship between Russia and the West after Kosovo, 
policy-makers reflected both the zero-sum institutional game of the late 
1990s by balancing NATO and the EU against one another, and the overall 
perspective of stalling the fixation of a NATO-centered security arrangement 
in Europe. At the bottom line, however – as we shall see below – this ap-
proach harbored no illusions as to the possibility of breaking down internal 
coherence in NATO.  
4.2. The NATO–EU Nexus: Independent or Not? 
The nature of EU–NATO relations was a sphere of special interest for Rus-
sia. Indeed, in the official statements by Igor Ivanov that Russia had a pri-
mary interest in the development of the ESDP and that Russia would not stay 
on the sidelines of this process there were certain imminent expectations that 
it would either transform the NATO alliance, or simply make it superfluous. 
A more blunt statement to this latter end was made in the International Af-
fairs journal. Analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev contended that the St. Malo 
process and the Helsinki decision to create a rapid reaction capacity of 
60,000 men would “inevitably decrease the importance of US-dominated 
NATO.”179 
Yet, the common declaration between Russia and the alliance in February 
2000 suggested that Moscow was looking for a normalization of the relation-
ship to NATO. As suggested above, Russia wanted to “go slow” on this, 
however, and not rush into restoring a full-fledged relationship within the 
framework of the PJC. A major condition was “full assurance that the alli-
ance will not allow a violation of the Founding Act between Russia and 
NATO [i.e. references to the UN Charter].”180 Still, during the summer of 
2000, a relatively wide agenda was opened, including discussions on com-
bating terrorism, proliferation and crisis management. Officially, Moscow 
formulated this policy to the end that all states on the European continent 
should be included in a common security structure. Hence, “Russia believes 
that the formation of a NATO-centric system is erroneous.” On the other 
hand, this did not mean that “we tend to ignore or not fully appreciate the 
role of NATO in European affairs”. Indeed, Ivanov maintained: “Russia has 
made considerable efforts to transform our contacts with the Alliance into a 
substantial element in the European system of security and stability [by sign-
ing the Founding Act].”181 
Russian research communities were not in agreement on the development 
of NATO. Those supporting the multipolar point of departure tended to see 
the Primakovian policies as a model for the Putin administration as well. In 
their analysis, the Primakovian period was the sole exception after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union when Russia’s foreign policies had been consis-
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tent and coherent.182 More so, this perspective held that Russia had a special 
mission in the sense that it was by and large up to Russia’s foreign policy 
choices whether or not Europe would transform into “larger Europe with free 
participation of states on equal terms […] or status quo, with Europe as the 
junior partner of the US.”183 Such assertions recommended the new admini-
stration under Putin to take up the banner of an independent foreign policy – 
not in direct confrontation with the US – but still a policy that could serve as 
a counterweight against “the global arbitrariness of single states or clusters 
of states (such as the US and NATO) and defend the leading functions of the 
UN.”184 
More detailed academic analyzes of the European security architecture 
and Russia’s possible choices had a different vantage point. Again, the vol-
ume written by Moshes and Danilov made more explicit references to the 
tightly coupled network of West European and transatlantic institutions. To 
be sure, the volume did not harbor any illusions as to Russia’s capacity to 
influence the development of the European security architecture. On the con-
trary, Russia could lean back and watch how the European system itself de-
veloped along certain inherent conflicting lines. Hence:  
 
The mutual violation of this division of labor looks like a paradox, as the military 
bloc NATO on the one hand is becoming a political organization and the peace-
ful European Union is “militarized” on the other. […] In a strategic perspective 
this process is in complete harmony with Russia’s interests. First, how paradoxi-
cal it may seem, this “militarization” will facilitate a demilitarization of interna-
tional relations, since the military dimension of the EU will play a supportive 
role in the EU’s complex security policy. […] Secondly, a strengthening of the 
role and responsibilities of the EU/WEU would strengthen the perspectives for 
cooperation [reciprocity] between Russia and the West in the sphere of security. 
185 
 
The argument of reciprocity was central, in so far as the analysts maintained 
that the OSCE would be an uncertain foundation for a proactive Russian se-
curity strategy in Europe. As suggested above, they called for the need to 
depart from the “blind alley” of the OSCE strategy, asserting that this would 
only imply further back-pedalling for Russia’s policy in Europe. Opening a 
dialogue on the ESDP would – on the other hand –  put Russia in position 
with regard to future developments, and hence, Russia’s policies would be 
less reactive. Moreover, a more proactive and security-oriented relationship 
with the EU would also lead Russia out of the blind alley of having to accept 
and rely too heavily on NATO in the post-Kosovo period. Thus, without ex-
cluding the OSCE and NATO, Russia should pursue a diversification of its 
policies in the European vector: 
 
This will make it possible to conduct an active and not a passive policy, and also 
to influence important European processes by cooperating with the EU/WEU. 
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This political course will in itself not imply a cooling down of relations with the 
US and NATO […] And there should be no reason to harbor illusions that the 
Western system is a system of counterweights, where a strengthening of the 
“European” weight implies to weaken the American one.186 
In sum, this position suggested that Russia should not nurture any illusions 
that it would be possible to “divide” NATO. Still, the analysis seemed to 
suggest that the EU could play a role as a softer version of NATO, thereby 
removing some of the inherent Russian misperceptions of NATO. The ar-
gument went that “Russian society does not fear a militarized EU and the 
Russian public opinion and elite do not have a negative perception of the 
EU, which stands out in sharp contrast to NATO.”187 Moreover, as Dmitry 
Danliov asserted: “Russia has made it clear that its attitude to the enlarge-
ment of NATO and the strengthening of military activities in NATO have 
nothing in common with Russia’s attitude to the enlargement of the EU and 
its ‘militarization’.”188 
This argument is launched numerous other places, but does – however in-
triguing – still not deal with the issue of capacities and the political issue of 
what an independent EU in the field of crisis management would imply in 
the relationship with Russia. Russian researchers pursued a strategy that 
aimed at filling the institutional void in Russia–Western Europe relations, 
but the proposed trilateral configuration offered little in terms of institutional 
leverage. Moreover, it was not clear what kind of institutions would emerge 
on the basis of a tighter dialogue. The Paris summit had offered consulta-
tions on security issues, but no institutional framework beyond the PCA. 
What is clear is the fact that the Russian research community did not see any 
possible way for Russia to use the EU as leverage on other institutions, such 
as NATO, or the US.  
4.3. Cooperation at Arm’s Length: The Problem of ESDP 
Russian officials had approached the Paris summit by listing certain main 
questions concerning the development of the ESDP. This cautious approach 
materialized in an optimistic Russian policy succeeding the summit. Speak-
ing in Berlin on November 25, 2000, Ivanov stated that the Paris summit had 
“entailed important principal agreements in this field [the Europeans aspira-
tions for providing for their own security].” Moreover, Russia and the EU 
should:  
 
[…] together study possible contributions from Russia to operations by the 
European Union in crisis management. Of course, we need to work jointly to 
form an appropriate legal framework and mechanisms for dealing with our re-
spective interests.189 
 
As stated above, Russia’s interests were confined to defining the geographi-
cal area of Petersberg operations, possible linkages between third countries 
                                                     
186  Ibid. p. 109. 
187  Ibid. p. 110. 
188  Dmitry Danilov, ”Zadumchivost’ iz kotoroy pora i vyyti”, Dipkur’er-NG, October 2000. 
189  Igor Ivanov, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v epokhu globalizatsii, op.cit. p. 215. 
Geir Flikke 
nupi december 03 
54 
and the EU in Petersberg operations and in securing strict commitment to the 
UN Charter.190 Russian foreign policy officials repeatedly focused on these 
interests, also during 2001. Speaking on the “strategic” nature of Russia–EU 
relations in April 2001, Ivanov once again suggested that Russia and the EU 
had made substantial progress on the issue of European security, but still he 
called for more concrete results. The objective of the CFSP and the ESDP 
should be “the strengthening of stability and mutual trust, and also strict ad-
herence to the UN Charter”, he maintained. Moreover:  
 
Now we must make the ideas that are promoted in this document [the Paris 
summit Appendix] more concrete and translate them to the area of practical co-
operation. In particular, Russia is prepared to cooperate with the EU to 
strengthen stability and security on our continent, among other things by elabo-
rating the parameters of future crisis management operations with participation 
from future European rapid reaction forces.191 
 
The need to clarify the rules was repeated also elsewhere. Institute of Europe 
researcher Dmitry Danilov identified four aspects of “common interests”, 
through which Russia’s president could move away from the tendency to 
simply await developments in European affairs and move from a “reactive 
foreign policy, to an assertive one”.192 First, Russia should utilize the oppor-
tunity to engage in a conceptual discourse on European security institutions, 
European security at large and the ESDP. This would involve elaborating the 
parameters for use of military power. Secondly, both parties should define 
technical areas for concrete miltary and technological cooperation that would 
help the EU overcome inherent limitations on military capacities; thirdly, 
Russia should be allowed to take part in discussing scenarios for participa-
tion in Petersberg operations and fourthly, since the EU underlined “civilian” 
tasks in crisis management, possibilities for cooperation in civilian crisis 
management should be explored.193 
Hence, both research circles and official policies pulled in the same direc-
tion. Yet, as policies played out, beginning rapprochement would reveal dif-
ferences in interests. There are indications that the EU and Russia were dis-
cussing several aspects of the emerging security relationship during the 
spring of 2001. Igor Ivanov stated on April 6, 2001 after a meeting with 
Javier Solana in Moscow that the EU and Russia had an excellent dialogue 
on security issues. More so, the minister of foreign affairs was reportedly 
satisfied with the level of negotiations. Solana met with the minister of the 
interior, Vladimir Rushailo, and the minister of defense, former Secretary of 
the Security Council, Sergey Ivanov. Even declared hard-liner Leonid 
Ivashov announced to the press that talks were on “conflict prevention and 
joint peacekeeping operations on the Balkans.”194  
To be sure, these talks took place on the background of an escalation of 
the crisis in FYROM, and Russia framed these events as a large-scale crisis 
reaching from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Igor Ivanov 
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had hence in March announced that Russia would not “stand on the sideline 
with regard to events on the Balkans”, and that “Moscow’s task now consists 
in convincing the world that the situation in Macedonia is only a part of a 
larger war from the Philippines to Indonesia, the Caucasus and the Bal-
kans.”195 
Whether these circumstances contributed to cooling off the dialogue is 
hard to estimate. Dov Lynch observes at any rate: “Russia was informed 
about EU policies during the crisis in Macedonia but had no say in the de-
velopment of European policy.”196 What is clear is that expectations reached 
a certain peak in 2001. Indeed, other researchers have highlighted the March 
23, 2001 meeting as a central milestone, where Moscow tried to engage the 
ESDP. As analyzed above, Moscow tried to mediate in the internal political 
standoff in rump-Yugoslavia in September 2000. Although not successful, 
this attempt, combined with the partial progress in the EU–Russia security 
dialogue in October 2000, may have prompted a hope that the EU would at-
tain a more central security role on the Balkans with Russia as a co-sponsor. 
Russian analyst Vladimir Baranovsky suggests as much. In his analysis, 
the March 23 meeting took place on the background of US rejection of send-
ing additional forces to the Balkans, and emerging EU ambitions to provide 
a separate CESDP force.197 Baranovsky notes that President Boris 
Traikovsky of Macedonia also attended the meeting, and that CFSP envoy to 
Macedonia, Francois Lyotard, raised the issue in Moscow in September 
2001. Finally, he suggests: “this was the first of when Russia-CESDP inter-
action could have been translated into practice.”198 Indeed, also Baranovsky 
suggests that the major reason for this was the fact that the Europeans were 
“technically and politically unprepared” for this, and that Russia’s trouble-
some relationship to NATO was the single most important technicality that 
hampered closer interaction.  
Realities may have intercepted with policies even at an earlier stage. By 
May 2001 and the EU–Russia summit in Moscow, the initial optimism that 
had characterized research communities was substituted by a more tempered 
analysis of the actual prospects for a closer interaction between Russia and 
the EU in the security field.  Institute of Europe analyst Dmitry Danilov even 
suggested that the EU and Russia had switched places in the ongoing debate 
on the ESDP. Whereas Russia initially had reacted somewhat reluctantly to 
the ESDP process and held a rather vague position, Russia was now “strug-
gling to maximize the level of cooperation, whereas the EU does not recip-
rocate.”199 Danilov identified several issues as being problematic, among 
other things the level of consultations. Russia was seeking consultations that 
were equal in scope to those of NATO – a proposal the EU refused in fear of 
jeopardizing the ESDP. Moreover: 
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Russia is stubbornly proposing to Brussels first to define the geographic scope of 
future Petersberg operations, secondly to take on the obligation to use military 
power only to use military force with a UN mandate. The Europeans are softly 
contending that let us first of all create these forces and only afterwards define 
where and how we will use them.200 
 
This assessment was not entirely negative to future developments of EU–
Russia relations within the security field. In fact, the analyst viewed the 
“sincere wish of the Swedish government to develop the dynamics opened 
by the Paris summit” as a positive indication that a partnership could de-
velop.201 Yet, institutional developments were not favorable with regard to 
Russia’s (and even the EU’s) chances to embark on deepening the relation-
ship. The EU was in fact anticipating a solution to the deadlock over access 
to NATO resources in Nice, Danilov maintained, and Turkey’s blocking of 
this in Nice 2001 hampered a development of the relationship. Hence: 
 
Can Moscow really count on serious movement with regard to the EU’s position 
on developing a partnership with Russia in conflict management while the Union 
has not succeeded in landing a contract from NATO on future European opera-
tions? This is impossible, even technically. […] But what is even more important 
is the fact that the Europeans do not want to irritate their transatlantic partners by 
excessive rapprochement with Moscow.202 
 
Hence, if the political climate was conducive to a rapprochement between 
the EU and Russia, there were certain obstacles that hampered closer coop-
eration. Russian analysts came to consider these as first and foremost linked 
to the NATO–EU nexus. This position was not one that emerged from the 
preconceived suggestion that Russia could encourage the EU to take steps 
that would imply greater distance to NATO. Rather on the contrary, analysts 
seemed to interpret the non-event of closer cooperation between the EU and 
Russia in this field as a product of certain political and structural limitations 
inherent in the EU.  
On the other hand, Russian analysts also maintained that Russia was not 
ready for a closer cooperation with the EU in this field. Baranovsky suggests 
that “there was (and still is) a need to recognize that military-related coop-
eration with the EU is simply not feasible without restoring interaction with 
NATO”.203 Moreover, speaking in Brussels in October 2001, Dmitriy 
Danilov suggested that Russia was not ready to meet the EU process, and 
that the debate on possible interaction and cooperation was confined to aca-
demic circles only.204 Russia could not expect to gain militarily on cooperat-
ing with the ESDP. The crux of the matter was more that of playing a con-
siderable role, Danilov asserted. 
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There are three general motifs that seem to be crucial in explaining Russia’s atti-
tude. First, Russia’s is interested in increasing the EU’s political weight, which is 
consistent with Russia’s concept of a multipolar world. Secondly, this would in-
crease the potential for a two-sided strategic partnership, which is considered by 
Russia as especially important for its integration into Greater Europe. Thirdly, 
the increasing EU autonomy in foreign and security policy would bring new op-
portunities for the latter to reach its security aims and strengthen its own voice in 
Europe.205 
 
This development suggests several things. First, that Russia’s priorities 
within the foreign policy and security field were not substantially altered by 
the comprehensive internal discourse on the Western security architecture in 
Europe and the attempt to address the ESDP. Russian analysts may have 
harbored certain expectations with regard to possible compensation for the 
decline in institutional powers and also called for new institutional arrange-
ments. Secondly, the traditional perspective of damage limitation and realist 
assumptions that Russia wanted to secure a multipolar world was, according 
to liberal researchers, central in understanding Moscow’s position. Clearly, 
researchers assumed that Russia had more to gain from pronouncing will-
ingness to cooperate than from remaining passive and receptive to changes 
in the European security debate. In the final analysis, however, the sugges-
tion that Russia would “strengthen its voice in Europe” implied that focus 
would be on security gains and the overall perspective was to stall a NATO-
centerd security system in Europe. 
This said, it is clear, however, that the internal debate in Russia on the 
Western security architecture in many aspects departed from the overriding 
perspective of “wedge-driving” – that is, dividing Europe and the US. In 
fact, most assessments seemed to coalesce with the assertions made by 
Moshes and Danilov that Russia – being marginalized from the Western se-
curity debate – would still, and independently of whether or not the Putin 
administration chose a proactive policy – only be an observer of the devel-
opments in Europe. Choosing the ”European” path would certainly make 
Russia a more visible player in Europe, but not necessarily result in direct 
access, let alone leverage on European developments.  
The degree of overlap with official policies on this particular instance is 
an open question, however. Clearly, Russia had approached the EU in a con-
ditional manner. After the Paris summit Russian officials had not only sug-
gested that the security dialogue should be institutional, but also at a level 
that paralleled the institutions that Russia had with NATO.206 This policy 
more than suggested that Russia perceived the EU as a possible contender to 
NATO and that an institutionalization of the security dialogue with the EU 
should be sculpted in a manner that supported a further drifting apart in 
transatlantic relations.  
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5. Linking up to Europe: The EU and NATO in Russia’s Secu-
rity Debate after September 11  
The former chapter concludes that Russian policy-making circles contributed 
significantly to raise the awareness of the EU as an alternative interlocutor 
for Russia in the field of security. Expectations that the EU–Russia dialogue 
initiated at the Paris summit would transform into a genuine cooperation 
reached a climax in 2001 and ebbed out as it became evidently clear that the 
EU would not link up too closely with Russia in regional crisis management. 
The limitations of the dialogue were also evident. Russia wanted new institu-
tions and an institutional dialogue, while the EU maintained that the ESDP 
was only in its beginning phase.  
There is hardly a study of Russian security thinking that does not con-
ceive of September 11 as a watershed in Russia’s relationship to the West,207 
and the following chapter will analyze perceptions after September 11. This 
division line indicates that there has been a substantial change in Russia’s 
priorities vis-à-vis the EU and NATO succeeding the attack on the World 
Trade Center. On the one hand, the terrorist attacks have evoked notions of a 
paradigmatic change in global security affairs – a change that by default 
should lead to a closer cooperation between Russia and the Western security 
institutions. The Russian debate took these events into consideration and 
conceptualized Russia as an inevitable partner in transatalantic relations.  
On the other hand, the discourse has developed around central ambigui-
ties that have been accentuated further. Russian policy-makers have still 
called for comprehensive triangular or bilateral security arrangements in 
Europe and have voiced uncandid disappointment over the fact that the EU–
Russia dialogue on these issues has stagnated. At the bottom line, the Sep-
tember 11 events most certainly highlighted the need for a further rap-
prochement between Russia and the West – meaning the US, the EU and 
NATO. Simultaneously, the Russian discourse did not depart substantially 
from earlier assertions that the EU in many ways was an incomplete actor in 
the field of security and that institutionalizing the relationship with NATO 
presented certain difficulties for Russia.  
5.1. Hyper-terrorism: An Agenda for Further Rapprochement? 
If the Kosovo crisis had informed the Russian policy-making community 
that Russia was without any say whatsoever in European security affairs, 
September 11 evoked a feeling that Russia still had something to contribute 
with in the fight against international terrorism. According to deputy chair-
man of the Duma’s Defense Committee, Aleksey Arbatov, “participation in 
the war against terrorism is the main thing that Russia can offer the West in 
its further integration into Europe.”208 Similarly, a report on the relationship 
between the EU and Russia voiced: “Russia’s role in shaping the antiterrorist 
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coalition has created new opportunities for Russia’s cooperation with the 
European Union and the USA.”209  
Clearly, the attack underpinned a sense of paradigmatic change in global 
security affairs that was duly noted in policy-making and research communi-
ties. Indeed, it spurred the notion that Russia did in fact face a similar “win-
dow of opportunity” vis-à-vis the Western community, as did the West. The 
Council for Foreign and Security Policies noted in a May 2002 report on 
Russia’s security that: 
 
September 11 ended the period of ‘celebration’ of the end of the Cold War, dur-
ing which most capitals, including Moscow, allowed themselves inaction with 
regard to the new security challenges. As civilizational and social differences 
sharpen along the North–South axis the disadvantages of this situation have be-
come evident. Russia and the West have not overcome the heritage of the Cold 
War, but remain ‘semi-enemies and semi-partners’.210 
 
The report stressed that the moment was ripe for leaving this conundrum, 
and that the realignment of Putin behind the US in Central Asia had offered 
at least a “theoretical possibility” that Russia could leave the deadlock and 
develop into a full-fledged partner of the Western security community.211 
Central prerequisites for this, the report suggested, should be to develop the 
dialogue with the US on strategic questions, while focusing on the energy 
dialogue and the political dialogue with the EU. 
Although the SVOP report offered several new options for Russia, it still 
revealed that Russia faced a Western security system that still was lingering 
under the effect of the Kosovo crisis. The OSCE was, according to the 
SVOP report, “marginalized and silently declining.” Moreover, Russia had 
“during the last 12 years erroneously made the organization the center piece 
for securing its political and security interests in Europe”.212 On the other 
hand, Russia could utilize the opportunity provided by the September 11 
events to address the EU’s security dimension, thereby fuelling the political 
dialogue. Russia should seek this option not the least for political reasons, 
although it was unclear what the EU would actually achieve in this field.  
 
The events of September 11 have spurred the discussion on activating the so-
called European policies in the field of security and defense. But this discussion 
is only in its opening phase. These plans may be hindered by conscious interfe-
rence from the outside, as well as the fact that this concept is directed towards 
repulsing old threats or marginal challenges (such as instability in Macedonia), 
and hence may be rendered obsolete. At the same time Russia is objectively inte-
rested in developing the cooperation with the EU in the field of security, at least 
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for political reasons, but also in order to combat new threats: terrorism, drug 
smuggling, trafficking, criminality and other internal European problems.213 
 
This lengthy quotation suggested that the Russian policy-making community 
had not been especially impressed by the performance of the ESDP. 
Whereas a possible EU mission in Macedonia had been a primary focus for 
Russia in discussing the ESDP in 2001, the SVOP report more than indicated 
that the Russian political and research community did not view the ESDP as 
particularly effective. Moreover, talks with the EU had imbued the Russian 
research community with a greater sense of realism concerning what the EU 
actually could offer in terms of security. 
Similar sentiments were reflected also in discussions on European secu-
rity following the September 11 events. In pro-European foreign and security 
circles, the attack on the WTC was conceptualized as marking the end of the 
Cold War and the beginning of the era of hyper-terrorism. In deputy chair-
man of the Committee of Defense, Aleksey Arbatov’s phrase, hyper-
terrorism implied: “international terrorism plus WMD.”214 Although offering 
a platform for orienting Russia towards Europe in order to boost further in-
tegration, this view was coupled with a tint of conditionality. Initially Russia 
and the Western community faced similar risks connected with ethnic and 
religious conflicts in Europe, organized crime, illegal migration and smug-
gling of weapons and narcotics. Yet, the absence of a joint strategy could 
imply that single states would combat terrorism in violation of international 
law. Expressing a preference for the EU and disapproving US unilateralism, 
Arbatov stated that  
 
In this sense, Europe, that is, the European Union is by default substantially 
closer to Russia in formulating such a common strategy, than the US. This is due 
to the fact that the EU acts multilaterally, adopts common rules for conduct and 
adequate solutions, however complicated they might seem. All of this brings 
Europe and Russia closer together.215  
 
Although a “preferred partner”, Arbatov maintained that the EU was not able 
to go far in developing genuine cooperation with Russia. For one thing, the 
“unclear relationship between the military bloc of the EU and NATO is still 
an object of heated discussions”, Arbatov contended: “As long as these rela-
tions are not worked out, Europe cannot go far in cooperating with the Rus-
sian Federation.”216 Analyst Sergey Karaganov offered an even more direct 
assessment in suggesting that the EU was suffering under a complete lack of 
perspective vis-à-vis combating not only the new challenges, but also in de-
fining the scope of Petersberg operations.  
 
The absence of a distinct European voice in security affairs and the lack of a 
clearly defined agenda create problems for Russia in the dialogue with Europe 
on military-political questions and security. They propose to cooperate in peace-
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keeping, but do not say where. They propose to prepare for joint operations, but 
they do not say what kind of operations.217 
 
In the upshot, Russian policy-makers saw the actual prospects of a closer as-
sociation between the EU and Russia in the sphere of security as warranted, 
yet not likely to happen. Earlier assertions that the EU in some way could 
emerge as a preferred partner at the expense of NATO, was substituted by 
emerging realism. First, Russian policy-makers were uncertain about 
whether or not the EU could deliver within the field of defense and security. 
Secondly, the EU seemed in fact to prepare for the challenges of yesterday 
and had no clear agenda in combating hyper-terrorism. Thirdly, insufficient 
institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and Russia – that is a 
lingering PCA agreement and largely symbolic mutual strategies – reflected 
a standstill in EU–Russia relations that could result in a new line of division 
in Europe. 
This did not imply, however, that the idea of tighter coordination and in-
tegration with the West was abandoned altogether. Indeed, the SVOP saw no 
other viable alternative for Russia than maximum integration with the West. 
In fact, the report voiced that Russia should enter into a strategic union with 
the West and secure: “maximum rapprochement with the West, avoid con-
frontation and defend only vital interests.”218 This also involved that the 
SVOP – with the exception of Aleksey Arbatov – recommended a revision 
of earlier “wedge-driving” strategies. According to SVOP recommendations, 
Russia should – obviously for reasons of being the weaker part in US–Russia 
relations – seek to develop a bilateral security dialogue with the EU follow-
ing the French proposal [a reference to the French initiative from October 
2000] on a tight security dialogue between Russia and the EU. In this per-
spective: 
 
A renewal of the French idea to create a security union [sic] between the EU and 
Russia on matters pertaining to terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, illegal migra-
tion and so forth should be secured. […] Joint action and consultation with the 
EU on a broad number of questions in the bilateral relationship should be intensi-
fied. […] In the event of increased differences in the approach of Western 
Europe and the US, Russia should not play on these differences as earlier, but at-
tempt to maximize influence while fulfilling the role as an integrator of the Euro-
Atlantic security space.219 
 
Playing the role as integrator of the Euro-Atlantic security space would – 
among other things – imply that Russian policy-makers held a different and 
more proactive view of questions pertaining to NATO’s development. En-
hancing the dialogue with the EU on central soft-security issues would cer-
tainly not be an obstacle for this. Indeed, the SVOP report proposed to 
“make active use of the Committee NATO at 20 to gain concrete experience 
in cooperation within a limited field of questions.”220  
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Yet, the “NATO at 20” structure activated certain inherent ambiguities in 
Russia’s relationship to Europe. Indeed, as the government newspaper Ros-
siyskaya gazeta suggested, the question was simply “How much NATO?”221 
Would further institutionalization with NATO imply that the heritage of the 
in Russia’s view ineffective PJC would be surmounted? Could NATO actu-
ally absorb a partner stretching from Europe to Asia?  
5.2. “NATO at 20”: Limitations and Ambiguities 
Dov Lynch has characterized the relationship between Russia and NATO as 
being marked by three distinct periods. The post-Kosovo period of sharp 
protest against NATO centrism in Europe ended with the invitation of Lord 
Robertson to Moscow in February 2000. The second period lasted until Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and was distinguished by a pragmatic resumption of the 
political dialogue with the PJC. The third period is characterized by a widen-
ing of the NATO-Russia agenda and a new institutionalized relationship 
with the “NATO at 20” structure.222 
As mentioned above, during these different periods, Russia’s response to 
NATO was never one of blind submission to the facts of NATO enlarge-
ment, let alone to NATO’s campaign in Kosovo. The Concept of Russia’s 
Foreign Policies voiced that “real and constructive cooperation between 
NATO and Russia is possible only if it is founded on mutual respect for the 
parties’ interests and unconditional fulfilment of the obligations that the par-
ties have taken on themselves.”223 In Moscow parlance, this had been the 
policy of Russia also during the Kosovo crisis, a crisis that was conceptual-
ized as being in violation of the Founding Act. According to Igor Ivanov: “In 
this [Kosovo] situation, Russia did not isolate from NATO, nor did it engage 
in conflict with NATO. Russian diplomacy pursued a constructive path 
[…].”224 
The Kosovo crisis had activated a central dilemma for Russia. Russia was 
not able to stall developments in Europe, or to gain a viable foothold in 
European security structures. Hence, Putin’s resumption of the dialogue with 
NATO and his pragmatic acceptance of matter-of-fact-like developments 
such as NATO enlargement indicate that Russia sees itself as well served by 
being a part of a dialogue, rather than being on the fringes of the Western se-
curity architecture. By late 2001 this position had evolved into a more prag-
matic view on NATO enlargement and possible areas of cooperation be-
tween Russia and the alliance. Commenting on the contents of the PJC meet-
ing in Brussels on December 7, 2001, Igor Ivanov stated that Russia and 
NATO, by entering into the “NATO at 20” format, had initiated a radical 
turn in NATO–Russia relations. Concerning the enlargement issue, Ivanov 
contended: “This question was not raised today. Every state has a sovereign 
right to enter into this or that organization.” Still: “We believe that in the 
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current situation, where we are facing the challenge from international will 
not strengthen the security of the member states or future members.”225 
Following in this vein, Russian policy-making and research communities 
have not refrained from stressing that Russia would like to have an effect on 
the “NATO at 20” agenda, including questions that are labelled ultimate 
Russian concerns. Sergey Karaganov termed the “Blair plan” as a structure 
through which Russia could “actively cooperate with Europe and NATO,”226 
although the mandate of NATO was a limited one. Moreover, since the ques-
tion of NATO enlargement was not on the “NATO at 20” agenda, Russia 
would be well served by keeping a semi-institutionalized structure through 
which the 19+1 structure should still be active. Hence, Karaganov suggested 
that Russia should retain a similar possibility for holding back certain themes 
from the agenda with NATO. 
 
For Russia it would be optimal to keep two structures – “19+1” and “NATO at 
20.” The mechanism “19+1” could perhaps discuss CBM issues and limitations 
on military activities of NATO in new member countries. This structure should 
pursue a clear aim – to avoid that NATO enlargement – which is practically in-
evitable – turns into a factor that complicates the relationship between Russia 
and the West. […] At the same time, the mechanism “NATO at 20” should be 
put into effect to boost cooperation between Russia and NATO, for example on 
combating hyper-terrorism, proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological 
weapons and civilian defense.227  
 
As suggested by Karaganov, Russian policy-makers were still lending an ear 
to the post-enlargement situation and the distribution of conventional weap-
ons in Europe after the admission of new members. As suggested by Aleksey 
Arbatov, “it is easy [for NATO] to repeat that it [enlargement] is not in vio-
lation of Russian interests, but still more difficult to adopt deep-going meas-
ures in cutting down on conventional weapons in Europe and adopt an obli-
gation not to station NATO forces on the territory of new members.”228 In a 
collective work by the Committee “Russia in United Europe”, this point was 
made even more explicit. According to this report, which took on the termi-
nology of the paradigmatic post-September 11 changes in global security 
and echoed concerns that Russia and Europe were slow in responding to the 
threats, the sheer strength of NATO was a concern with regard to enlarge-
ment.  
 
[…] the problems that we inherited from the Cold War and that have manifested 
themselves in the relations between Russia and the West still remain unresolved. 
For Russia, it is first of all the problem of the two million-strong armed forces 
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and NATO’s enormous arsenal of conventional arms, which acquire special sig-
nificance in view of NATO’s expansion to the East.229 
 
In summarizing the new challenges, the report voiced old concerns of Mos-
cow that limitations should be put on the presence of NATO forces in new 
member countries, that nuclear zones should be created in the center of 
Europe [Kaliningrad and Belarus] and that these issues should be the pri-
mary focus for NATO–Russia cooperation. The report also offered a more 
traditional corollary to the European Union in suggesting that “the European 
Union should also draw conclusions from the contradictory relations existing 
between Russia and NATO in the past ten years. […] Inclusion of Russia in 
the sphere of security and defense (Russia’s participation in the Petersberg 
missions, military and technical cooperation) cannot be regarded as an act of 
EU charity. Rather, Russia with its significant intellectual potential, ad-
vanced military technologies may become a vital partner of the European 
Union.”230 
The inherent ambiguity in these perceptions could be understood in a re-
alist versus institutionalist perspective. In conceptualizing the relationship 
between Russia and Europe the Russian research and policy-making com-
munity distinguished between two primary positions in the internal discourse 
following the September 11 events. On the one hand, Russian derzhavniki 
would maintain that the prospects of Russia integrating into the Western se-
curity community were limited for geopolitical reasons. Russia should pri-
marily pursue national interests due to the fact that “the possibility of inte-
grating Russia into NATO is highly limited. For the US it is preferable that 
Russia remains an external partner to NATO. For leading European powers a 
Russia inside NATO is imbued with several problems, first and foremost 
that their partial weight in NATO would decrease.”231 On the other hand, 
Russian liberals stressed that Russia would be in a better position to influ-
ence European affairs if linking up with the Western security community. 
Playing the role as a primary integrator of the Euroatlantic security space, 
Russia could increase its role in European affairs and also overcome limita-
tions put on the economic relationship between the EU and Russia. Hence: 
 
They [those who favor integration] have a positive attitude to cooperation with 
NATO in the “NATO at 20” structure and maintain that Russia should submit to 
the fact that it will have a voice equal to that of a NATO member inside the Alli-
ance. NATO is considered a structure that Russia should participate in even un-
der the hegemony of the US, since there is a possibility that Russia, in cooperat-
ing with the European countries in NATO, could have a disciplinary effect on 
the US.232 
 
By 2002 this position seemed to have gained the upper hand in the foreign 
and security policy community in Russia – at least in SVOP circles. In fact, 
                                                     
229  Russia and the European Union: options for deepening strategic partnership, op.cit. p. 
43–44. 
230  Ibid. p. 45. 
231  Obshchiy arshin. Eksperty o budushchem Rossii, Russia in United Europe Report, Mos-
cow 2002, p. 11. 
232  Ibid. p. 9. 
Damage Limitation and Decline in Institutional Powers 
nupi december 03 
65 
the SVOP report on Russia and international security from May 2002 main-
tained that although many members of SVOP had recommended not signing 
the Founding Act from 1997, this position was altered for several reasons. 
On the one hand, the creation of the “NATO at 20” would certainly follow 
the path of the Founding Act in making NATO enlargement an easier affair 
for the Alliance, the report stated. On the other hand, Russia should not re-
peat earlier failures, such as refraining from influencing on NATO’s agenda, 
while still having to reconcile itself with NATO enlargement. 
 
Although there is a theoretical possibility that new conditions are underway for 
transforming NATO into a security alliance for combating the threats of the 21st 
century and operations outside the area of responsibility, this process can be 
stalled by institutional inertia and the US not wanting to tie its hands by taking 
on additional obligations. At any rate, it is worthwhile for Russia to utilize the 
new possibilities and engage in cooperation with NATO by pushing its agenda 
inside the “NATO at 20.” It’s impermissible to repeat the experience with 
“19+1” when we failed to influence on the agenda while simultaneously legiti-
mizing the further enlargement of the Alliance.233 
 
This approach echoed the often-repeated assertion in Russia’s policy circles 
that NATO was a fact, and that Russia could do little to remove this fact. 
Even when the Primakovian approach permeated Russian security thinking, 
Russian officials had been careful not to suggest that NATO should cease to 
exist as a security alliance. The sole point had been, as observed by Dov 
Lynch, that NATO should not be the only security organization in Europe, 
let alone the most fundamental one.234 
Although this current was by far the most central one among Russian lib-
erals, reflections were made also over the eventual weakening of NATO as 
an institution. Needless to say, this prospect did not worry Russian policy-
makers as much as a prosperous, enlarged NATO, which dealt with Russia at 
arm’s length. Again, Russian policy-makers threw in the US-Russia card in 
this part of the analysis as to indicate that any development that weakened 
the separate identity of Europe in security affairs actually would not be to the 
detriment of US interests or Russian interests. In Aleksey Arbatov’s phrase: 
“the attitude between Europe and the US is further complicated by European 
concerns that the US is leaving Europe and that NATO is marginalized as a 
security organization for Europe. […] How strange it may seem, Russian and 
US interests confluence at this point. The Americans are not concerned, 
since they do not worry about Europe. Russia is not concerned since NATO 
does not invite us, and the less important this organization, the better we will 
feel.”235 Sergey Karaganov made a similar point in assuming that the terror-
ist attacks had rendered European security organizations “dysfunctional or 
inadequate.”236 Hence, “while NATO has achieved most of its goals, and in 
the process become one of the most successful military alliances in history, it 
is nevertheless becoming weak and outdated.” Although prepared to back 
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“NATO at 20”, Karaganov maintained, the Russian policy-making commu-
nity was still in “doubts about NATO’s future relevance as an effective part-
ner.”237  
In the upshot, Russian assessments of the “NATO at 20” structure 
seemed to vacillate somewhere between the inevitable (need to cooperate 
with an enlarging alliance) and the possible (NATO becoming irrelevant). In 
this analysis, “it should not be forgotten”, Arkady Moshes asserts, “that 
Putin’s pragamtic stance on enlargement results from Russia’s inability to 
stop it, and not from reassessments of its implications.”238 In the final analy-
sis, Moshes contended, Moscow would prefer the Alliance to be less of a 
military alliance, and more of a political organization. Russia’s priorities 
would eventually be to cultivate bilateral arrangements and security “deals” 
involving select partners and coalitions.  
 
Moscow praises the NRC particularily for the fact that every state is legally rep-
resented there in an individual national capacity, not as an Alliance member. The 
latter emphasis encapsulates the essence of the Russian position: although inter-
ested in establishing cooperation with a certain group of states on certain secu-
rity-related issues, Moscow would nevertheless not necessarily like to associate 
this cooperation with the main institutional vehicle of the Western security sys-
tem.239 
 
Hence, the objectives of damage limitation could be met. Association with 
NATO in the “NATO at 20” structure would keep the process of European 
security an open-ended one, and provide Moscow with the opportunity to ac-
tively strengthen its voice in European security affairs.  
5.3. Cooperative Multipolarism: Ambivalence and Uncertainty 
At best, Russia’s policy towards the Western security institutions is still rid-
dled by ambivalence, although this ambivalence may be closely intertwined 
with the character of European institutions. In sum, the Russian policy-
making community was recommending a place in Western structures basi-
cally for pragmatic reasons. Russian policy-making communities were 
clearly relating to the fact of NATO enlargement and also seeking to influ-
ence on the NATO agenda by proposing that Russia should utilize the full 
possibilities of the “NATO at 20” structure. Moreover, the suggestion that 
the EU should emerge as some sort of viable alternative to NATO was not 
widely supported. This was partly due to the fact that the ESDP was still in 
its nascent phase, and that the EU was more concerned about sorting out the 
relationship to NATO than to enter into burdensome third-party relation-
ships.  
This said it is clear that many in the research community looked to the 
EU to solve what was conceptualized as an emerging security void in inter-
national relations. One aspect of this was the widespread notion that security 
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could become a field for closer interaction between Russia and the West. 
Following in this vein, the Russian research and policy-making community 
tended to hypertrophy security as the primary concern for the 21st century. 
According to Sergey Karaganov, “this aspect of foreign policy [economy] is 
losing significance in a world were security concerns are becoming the pre-
dominant issue.”240  
The suggestion that Russia should play the role as an integrator of the 
transatlantic community was fuelled by this notion of a security void devel-
oping in the West. The weakness of Western institutions called for a new 
and bold approach to security to which Russia was the key, some asserted. 
Sergey Karaganov developed this idea explicitly by suggesting that Russia 
was in fact the key to a more self-sufficient EU. Hence, “it is obvious to me 
that the EU, by maintaining an arm’s-length relationship with Russia, is seri-
ously weakening its own international standing, especially while interna-
tional security and geopolitics are regaining priority status.”241 
Making the G-8 a forum for global security questions, Karaganov sug-
gested, should compensate the absence of the EU as a viable partner for Rus-
sia. Moreover, new wine should be poured into the old bottles of the EU–
Russia relationship. Lamenting that the “EU’s mundane foreign generates 
practically no new ideas”, and that the French proposal to create an internal 
security alliance between Russia and the EU had disappeared in the EU bu-
reaucracy, Karaganov suggested that the EU and Russia should form a spe-
cial security council. 
 
It is also necessary to place the dialogue between EU and Russia into a new for-
mat, moving from general declarations to the discussion of concrete issues. One 
way to do this might be by creating a EU-Russian security council (within the 
framework of a broader security alliance) that would coordinate policies on, for 
example, WMD, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal business ac-
tivities and illegal migration.242 
 
As suggested by Dov Lynch, such assertions may reflect the inherent need 
for options in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia seeks to link up with as many 
Western institutions as possible, and does not shun the creation of new ones. 
On the other hand, the creation of new forums and institutions may very well 
duplicate existing ones and lead to further bureaucratization of a relationship 
which according to Russian estimates already is burdened with excessive bu-
reaucracy. At the bottom line, the very idea of creating an EU-Russia secu-
rity council seems too reminiscent of the Primakovian proposal to make the 
OSCE an arena for a similar structure in Europe.  
Ambivalence prevails also with regard to the nature of what Igor Ivanov 
recently called the multipolar world order. Apparently, the Putin administra-
tion tries to coin an alternative multipolar version to that of the Primakov 
doctrine. In Igor Ivanov’s phrase, “multipolarity does not imply competition, 
but interdependence and partnership between the various ‘building blocs’ of 
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the new world order.”243 Yet, at some point the contours of this order seem 
to fall into a rather repetitious pattern of balance and counterbalance. Align-
ment with the EU and NATO does not imply membership. Moreover, Russia 
does not refrain from pursuing foreign policy interests. 
One arena where this has spelled out is the Iraq crisis, where Russia sided 
with Germany and France in proposing a peaceful, UN-led resolution. Ac-
cording to Ivanov, “all countries are now responsible for the problems of the 
world and are finding new and deeper forms of international cooperation for 
dealing with them [new threats of hyper-terrorism]. These developments re-
flect an emerging multipolar order.”244 However, Russia does not suggest 
that this order in any way should resemble the clash of different cultures, let 
alone lead to any fundamental misunderstanding that Russia was opposing 
the US. On the contrary: 
 
The preservation of a unified Euro-Atlantic community, with Russia now part of 
it, is of immense importance. The development of a constructive partnership be-
tween my country, Europe and the US, united by a common responsibility for 
maintaining peace and stability in the vast Euro-Atlantic area and by a common 
concern for establishing a secure environment for our peoples serves this pur-
pose.245 
 
Although intriguing – at least in Russia’s view – there are no signs that an 
alliance with France and Germany in the Iraq question will develop into a 
renewal of what Russia several times has hinted to as a strategic alliance be-
tween Russia and the EU in international affairs. The Iraq crisis has certainly 
fuelled Russia’s multipolar version of the world, but not given Russia any-
thing in terms of cementing the partnership with the EU. In Igor Leshukov’s 
view a concert between the EU and Russia would be ideal in reconstructing 
Iraq, but still he suggests that Russia’s moves were based more on “anti-
American sentiment and a frustrated sense of national pride than the estab-
lishment of a responsible coalition with Europe based on a commonality of 
interests between Russia and Europe”.246 
Moscow does not pursue this line, but seeks to engage in non-
confrontational multipolarism. This implies that both the US and the EU are 
important partners for Russia. Speaking to Al-Jazzera, President Putin sug-
gested that the “world cannot be unipolar by definition […] it should be bal-
anced and multipolar. But this does not mean that by this multipolarity we 
mean some kind of confrontation.”247 Including the EU in this perspective, 
Putin stressed, however, that bilateral ties to France and Germany were of 
special importance.  
 
Our opinion on the overwhelming majority of questions, rather complex ques-
tions regarding Iraq, coincided with those of France and Germany. We highly 
value this work together and will do all we can to develop it, and not only on 
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Iraq or some other crisis situation, but also with regard to our cooperation with 
the European Union – Germany and France are key members of the European 
Union. We will try to build up these relations with Germany and France on in-
ternational issues in other parts of the world.248 
 
This points to a certain ambivalence in Moscow with regard to the EU as a 
foreign and security policy actor. As under Primakov, bilateral ties to central 
European partners are seen as more important than a strategic dialogue with 
the EU. Hence, although the multipolar approach is not confrontational, it 
clearly departs from the assertion that bilateral and triangular ties with Ger-
many and France can yield more direct benefits for Russia than institutional-
ized cooperation with the EU as such.  
This may also imply that Russia would advertise for more comprehensive 
institutional arrangements than the existing Western security network. 
Moreover, although the EU and major European nations still will be central 
actors for Russia in pursuing the aim of non-confrontational multipolarism, 
institutional arrangements such as the “NATO at 20” structure and the secu-
rity dialogue with the EU will make up for some of the inherent uncertainty 
immanent in Russia’s approach to Europe, but not for Russia’s implicit aim 
of defining a multipolar order based on equality and pluralism.  
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this report has been to analyze Russian perceptions of the 
EU as a security actor in the light of the interpretative approaches of damage 
limitation and decline in institutional powers. The findings are diverse and 
suggest that the Russian discourse on Europe is a pluralistic one – albeit with 
a specific direction – and that Russia seeks to become more coordinated with 
European affairs without becoming an outright member of European institu-
tions. The Russian policy-making environment has coopted a proactive view 
of European security policies and the Putin administration has made the 
European vector in foreign policies a visible one.  
As argued in this report, this was in part due to the realization that the 
OSCE offered limited institutional possibilities to influence on European se-
curity affairs. Addressing the ESDP would, in this perspective, enable Russia 
to seek new institutional arrangements with Europe and compensate for a 
decline in institutional powers. Russia’s President chose a head-on strategy 
in this respect, and gave extensive attention to the security dimension of the 
EU. At the EU–Russia summit in May 2000, a clause was introduced in the 
joint statement that opened for a closer dialogue within security. This re-
sulted in a common statement in the appendix to the Paris EU–Russia sum-
mit in October 2000. In spite of declarations, however, the EU and Russia 
have to all appearances failed to cooperate directly. Russia has urged the EU 
to define scope, geographical area and mandate for EU-operations, while the 
EU has maintained that the force structures have to be created first. A case in 
point was Russia’s focus on a EU peacekeeping mission in FYROM, where 
policy-making communities anticipated a joint effort between the EU and 
Russia. In dealing with this aborted joint action, researchers have pointed ei-
ther to Russia’s multipolar strategy to encourage EU independence to the 
detriment of NATO, or Russia’s reluctance to address NATO. 
As suggested in this report, the reassessment of Russia’s policies vis-à-
vis the Western security system contains certain elements of revision of the 
Primakov doctrine. Cooperative multipolarism does not exclude a tighter 
assosiation to the European and transatlantic system of security. Moreover, it 
seems clear that Russia has undergone an evolution with regard to the ESDP 
and CFSP of the EU. The perspective of wedge driving is not widely sup-
ported in academic circles and Russia’s ability to influence on internal 
NATO-EU affairs is seen as limited. This said, however, the conceptualiza-
tion of the EU as a preferred partner to NATO has included notions of a 
“demilitarization” of relations with the West. Russian analysts have also dis-
cussed the possible politization of NATO as to making the alliance less of an 
alliance and more of a political organization. This development, which in 
fact is seen as stemming not from Russia’s influence, but from internal de-
velopments in the EU, is pictured as in accordance with Russian interests, 
and also with the multipolar perspective.  
In the period after September 11, notions of a “demilitarization” of the re-
lationship to the West seem to have stranded in the internal Russian debate. 
The ESDP is more of a disappointment for Russia than an option. Russian 
policy-makers are clearly more realistic with regard to what the EU can de-
liver within this field, and more prone to think in terms of seeing NATO as 
the institution that defines the actual reach of the ESDP. The question is, 
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however, whether forging relations with NATO may have emerged as a sub-
stitute for the EU strategy in the sense that Russia seeks to influence Euro-
pean security by entering into “NATO at 20” and hence temper US unilater-
alism. Although Russia apparently has left the illusion of counterbalancing 
the US by playing on differences between the EU and the US, entering into 
the “NATO at 20” may still imply a strategy to strengthen Russia’s position 
in Europe.  
In sum, both damage limitation and decline in institutional powers offer 
insights into Russia’s security policies on the European arena. Short-term 
institutional priorities may serve long-term objectives, such as keeping the 
European security process as open and accessible as possible. An institu-
tional perspective may explain why the Russian pro-European policy-
making community has suggested that Russia should play the role as an in-
evitable partner in the transatlantic security space. The “NATO at 20” struc-
ture offers Russia an institutionalized platform in European security affairs, 
and a framework for debating Russian security concerns in the combatting of 
terrorism paradigm. The damage limitation perspective may explain why 
Russia conceded to NATO enlargement and why Russia has gone so far in 
encouraging the ESDP and also the CFSP. Hence, in Pavel Baev’s phrase, 
Putin “locates the main source of potential risks in US unilateralism, […] 
and intends to focus his European networking on preventing it.”249 This cer-
tainly coalesces with a closer cooperation with NATO in “NATO at 20.” 
According to Russian policy-makers, this cooperation could have a modify-
ing and balancing effect on the US. Alignment hence gives Russia the oppor-
tunity to balance, not necessarily by contrasting the ESDP and NATO, but 
by joining in with both processes and multiplying possible gains in the 
European dimension. 
Hiski Haukkala has summarized emerging problems in the EU–Russia re-
lationship as being located somewhere in between assertiveness and prag-
matic cooperation from the part of Russia. “It is this new combination of 
Russian assertiveness and fostering of pragmatic, selective cooperation that 
has seemed to give the initiative, possibly also the upper hand, to Russia in 
the relationship.”250 No doubt, this will continue to riddle the European 
community. Russia will expectedly not refrain from underlining that there is 
a certain institutional void in the relationship between Europe and Russia 
that needs to be filled with more comprehensive institutional arrangements 
in order to avoid new division lines in Europe. Russia would like the EU to 
be part of this, but will the EU?  
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